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Abstract
The growth of social media use raises significant questions related to
political information and its effect on political knowledge and participation. One
issue is whether social media delivers news and political information in a similar
manner as traditional news media sources, like newspapers, TV, and radio, by
contributing to political knowledge, which is linked to voter turnout. This
dissertation examines the relationship between an individual’s social media use,
their use of traditional news media sources, and whether they turn out to vote. It
utilizes American National Election Survey data from the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election to complete three studies. First, the dissertation compares people who
prefer social media and those who prefer traditional news media sources across
as series of political habits and attitudes. Second, it looks at the expansion of the
media environment and examines whether a person’s social media use and
preference for news or entertainment is related to political knowledge and voter
participation. Finally, this dissertation examines whether social media use
increases the odds an individual will turn out to vote, thus acting in a similar
manner as traditional news media.
The results identify differences between people who prefer social media
and people who prefer traditional news media sources. In particular, people who
prefer social media tend to be younger, have less political knowledge, and have
a lower voter turnout rate. However, unlike traditional news media use, the use of
social media did not increase the odds an individual turned out to vote in 2016.
Further, the use of social media and an individual’s content preference of
i

entertainment versus news was not related to political knowledge nor voter
turnout. While social media does not appear to have a positive relationship with
turnout, it does not appear to discourage a person from voting either. The results
suggest that more work needs to be done, including examining the relationship
between age, social media use and turnout, as well as how content length may
be related to political participation. Finally, further examination is needed of the
possible indirect ways social media may be related to voter attitudes and
participation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview
The 2016 U.S. presidential election featured several ways in which the
delivery of information via social media may or may not have influenced the
outcome of the election. From Donald Trump’s very active use of Twitter to
concerns over ‘fake news’ in social media timelines and the use of Facebook ads
by Russian interests, more than ever the potential impact of social media on
elections needs a better understanding. Due to the salacious nature of these
types of stories in the news media, one may be tempted to immediately believe
they made a difference in the election. The temptation is to believe that changes
in information consumption created by social media are affecting elections. This,
however, may not necessarily be the case. As early as 2008, social media was
being heralded as a great new political information source and tool for
campaigns. Many praised the 2008 Obama campaign for the role social media
played in his victory at the polls. Subsequent research, however, suggested it
wasn’t an important influencer (Kushin and Yamamoto 2010).
Information is a key component of the decision-making process. In political
decision-making, news and information has been found to increase the likelihood
of voting. Specifically, consuming news from traditional sources, like
newspapers, television, radio and the Internet, is positively related to turning out
to vote (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gentzkow
2006; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012; Popkin 1994; Prior 2005, 2007;
Smets and van Ham 2013). This behavior, and the decision to engage in it, is
important because voting is a key component of democracy. It is the way
1

individuals select representatives, indicate opinions on key issues, and in some
places actually make law via the initiative process. With the growth of the
Internet, and recently social media like Twitter and Facebook, individuals have
greater opportunity to receive news and political information in another manner.
In fact, this method is becoming preferred for those under 50, especially
Millennials and to a slightly lesser extent Gen Xers (Gottfried et al. 2016; Shearer
and Gottfried 2017). The Pew Research Center (2016) defines Millennials as
those born between 1981 and 1998, Generation X as those born from 1965 to
1980, Baby Boomers as being born between 1946 and 1964, and the Silent
Generation as those born between 1928 and 1945. This is a fundamental change
in how news is consumed. It remains unclear, however, whether receiving
information and news via social media acts in a similar manner as news from
traditional sources.
Changes in media technology affect the way individuals receive news and
information. This, in turn, can affect their involvement in government and politics.
By expanding the media environment and providing more choices, individuals
have a greater opportunity to self-select entertainment over news (Gentzkow
2006; Prior 2007). This, in turn, reduces the opportunities for incidental exposure
to news as well, which Downs (1957) argues is an important way individuals get
political information. This result of content preference was found to be true with
the growth of television and cable, but needs to be reexamined in the social
media era.
After approximately ten years of development and increasing growth in
2

social media use, it is important to understand the potential effects it is having
within the political realm. Already, significant issues and questions have surfaced
related to potential ways social media is affecting the political process in the
United States. While this dissertation does not directly examine issues like fake
news, Twitter bots or Facebook ad buys by Russian interests, the answers to the
broader questions it does address provide important context to these specific
topics. It seeks to clarify the relationship between social media, news and
political information. This includes who prefers social media over traditional news
sources and their political habits and attitudes. It also examines how the
expansion in the size of the media environment is related to political knowledge
and voter participation. Finally, it looks at whether social media increase the odds
an individual will turn out to vote, thus acting in a similar manner as traditional
news media. Overall, this dissertation asks what is the relationship between
social media, news and political information, and whether an individual turns out
to vote?

What is Social Media?
Generally speaking, ‘social media’ refers to a “broad and growing portion
of the Internet that is designed as a platform which allows users, and groups of
users, to create and exchange content, often in an interactive or collaborative
fashion” (Gainous and Wagner 2014, 2). This content creation and sharing can
take many forms, from the sharing of news articles and comments on platforms
like Facebook and Twitter, to the sharing of photos or graphics on popular sites
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like Instagram, Snapchat or Pinterest, to video on sites like YouTube and Vimeo.
While new sites are launched (and die) and the popularity and use of a site might
fluctuate, Gainous and Wagner (2014) argue that the general concept of social
media will likely continue to expand. “Even if a particular social media protocol
wanes in popularity, we anticipate that this user-dominated system will continue
to expand and more people will flock to it” (Gainous and Wagner 2014, 2).
When considering a definition of social media, it is helpful to look at the
key characteristics of these kinds of sites. These include the opportunity for
individuals to create their own profile, connect with others on the site, and to
create, share and access content and information (Carr and Hayes 2015; Donath
and Danah 2004; Goff 2013; Murthy 2013). From there, social media theorists
drill down into more specific aspects of these characteristics. For example, Goff
(2013) and Jue, Marr, and Kassotakis (2009) emphasize the presence of tools to
collaborate as an important aspect of social media. Carr and Hayes (2015)
include the ability “to opportunistically interact and selectively self-present” (50)
as part of their definition. Some definitions include the value an individual gains
from the site. This includes the ability to collaborate on the creation of content
and the ability to interact with others (Carr and Hayes 2015; Jue, Marr, and
Kassotakis 2009).
One important distinction is between ‘social network’ sites and ‘social
media’ sites. For some theorists, the connections made on a ‘social network’ site
are more personal, for example just with people one knows. The user community
is generally limited to their existing network of friends and colleagues. For
4

example, Facebook is a social network by its nature where your friends or
followers are primarily people you know, at least tangentially. This was the intent
from the start and founder Mark Zuckerberg put significant importance on the
ability of the site to make these connections and the value they add to the
individual. He considered it one way to make sure individuals were registering for
the site as themselves and not hiding behind an online persona, which was
happening on MySpace (Kirkpatrick 2011).
With social media sites, on the other hand, individuals connect and publish
content to broader audiences beyond their existing social network. The growing
popularity of social media sites and their reach beyond an individual’s own social
network provides the opportunity for someone to communicate with a broad
audience. With regard to Facebook, Marichal (2012) calls this “the blurring of
mass and personal communication…” (Marichal 2012, 5). Some theorists believe
the ability to make these broad connections is an important part of social media
(Carr and Hayes 2015). Twitter, which features followers that you may have no
real connection with outside the social media platform, including journalists,
celebrities, athletes and organizations, is a good example of a social media site.
In terms of a definition of social media for the purposes of this dissertation,
the main characteristics described at the beginning of this section serve us well:
The ability to create a personal profile, make connections with other users on the
site, and to create, share and access content and information. This encompasses
both social network and social media sites.

5

Brief History of Social Media
As a communication method, social media is a relatively young tool. In an
attempt to capture what it encompasses, Goff (2013) examines several older
online tools that have been around for decades to find similar characteristics. The
more recent tools most people identify with social media raised the usefulness
and popularity of these platforms. Among the more obvious tools are wikis and
blogs. Focusing on social networking sites, the earliest example of a website with
social networking characteristics is sixdegrees.com, which was launched in 1997.
This site reached 3.5 million users by 1999, sold for $125 million, and then
succumbed in 2000 to the burst of the Internet bubble (Kirkpatrick 2011). In 2002,
Friendster was launched as a site where individuals could create profiles that
their friends, as well as their friends of friends, could peruse in order to make
connections (Rivlin 2006). By 2003, several other social networking sites were
launched, including LinkedIn and short-lived sites like Tribe and Spoke. That fall,
a total of $36 million was invested into those four social sites, demonstrating the
potential investors saw in these platforms (Kirkpatrick 2011).
2004 saw the addition of two new sites in the social media space.
MySpace joined the social media universe in January with a site that allowed
users far more freedom to create their own profiles than the more-restrictive
Friendster. Then, in February, from a residence hall at Harvard University, Mark
Zuckerberg released the first version of ‘Thefacebook’ and slowly began
expanding it to select colleges throughout that year. Political affiliation was
included from the start as one of the few identifiers a person could choose for a
6

profile (Kirkpatrick 2011). Widespread adoption of the site, renamed simply
Facebook, started in September of 2006 when it became open to anyone over
the age of 13 years old who had an email address. Just a few months prior to
this, a new upstart social media tool - Twitter - was launched in March of 2006,
which some call a “microblogging service” (Goff 2013, 21). The growth and
access to social media tools was accelerated in mid-2007 with the release of the
first iPhone (Vogelstein 2008). This allowed individuals easy access to the sites
via mobile applications and put social media just a few clicks away at any time
and in any place.
New social media sites have launched in the ten years since widespread
growth of Facebook and Twitter. One particular area of growth has been in photo
sharing sites. Top among these is Instagram, launched in October 2010. It didn’t
take long for Facebook to recognize both the popularity and value of Instagram
and in May 2012 it purchased the company for $1 billion (Williams-Hawkins
2013). Snapchat was started in 2011 as an application for shooting and sending
disappearing photos (Snap Inc. 2017). The company went public in March of
2017, renamed Snap Inc., and now also sells hardware, in this case a pair of
Snapchat sunglasses with a built-in camera allowing the wearer to shoot photos
and video which can be uploaded to the app (Snap Inc. 2017). An overview of
the launch year for major social media platforms in outlined in Table 1.1.

7

The Growth of Social Media Use
Social media use has grown significantly during the past 10 years. For
example, as of December 2017, Facebook has 1.4 billion daily active users
worldwide, and 2.13 billion monthly active users (Facebook Reports Second
Quarter 2017 Results 2017). Instagram has 800 million monthly active users as
of September 2017, an increase of 200 million since December 2016 (Number of
monthly active Instagram users from January 2013 to September 2017 (in
million) 2017). Although it is nearly as old as Facebook, Twitter has fewer active
users and hasn’t seen the meteoric growth that Facebook and Instagram have
demonstrated. At the end of 2017, Twitter had 330 million monthly active users
worldwide, 68 million of them in the United States. While it is growing more
slowly, it is still growing, with its user base representing a 12 percent growth in
daily active users over the same period in 2016 (Q4 and Fiscal Year 2017 Leter
to Shareholders 2018). Finally, Snapchat, the youngest of the platforms that are
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most popular in the United States, had 187 million daily active users worldwide at
of the end of 2017, which is an increase of 18 percent from the same time in
2016 (Snap Inc. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Results 2018). A
review of the percentage of U.S. adults on each major social media platform is
outlined below in Table 1.2.

News Consumption and the Shift to Online Sources
The use of social media specifically as a news source has grown
dramatically over the past decade (Gottfried et al. 2016; Purcell and Rainie 2014;
Shearer and Gottfried 2017). This is one reason for the increased interest in any
effects social media may have on political participation. It is also a reason for
concerns over the possible negative effects of social media sites on democracy
and elections. The consumption of news online is increasing and Americans
generally feel better informed because of online news opportunities (Gottfried et
al. 2016; Purcell and Rainie 2014). Overall, in August 2017, 67 percent of
9

Americans reported getting at least some news from social media, with 20
percent reporting that they ‘often’ get news this way and 27 percent reporting
they ‘sometimes’ do (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). In just a few short years,
social media has rocketed past traditional news sources like cable television,
local television and national broadcast and print outlets, to become a top source
of political information for Millennials and Gen Xers. Overall, social media has
been quickly catching up to television as a news source, with social media
increasing from 38 percent to 43 percent of people who often get news from that
source. At the same time, television has declined from 57 percent to 50 percent
(Shearer and Gottfried 2017).
The Pew Research Center conducted a survey in January of 2016 that
showed the growing role social media is playing in elections, especially for those
under the age of 50 (Gottfried et al. 2016). The study found that social media was
the top source of information related to the 2016 Presidential election for those
age 18 to 29. Thirty-five percent of respondents in that age group said it was the
most helpful source of information. Although not the top source, social media
ranked third on the list for those age 30-49, with 15 percent saying it was the
most helpful source of information (Gottfried et al. 2016). Overall, 78 percent of
those under the age of 50 report getting news via social media, according to a
September 2017 Pew study (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). Those over the age of
50, however, are closing the gap with 55 percent of respondents getting news
from social media sources. This is a 10 percent increase over the previous year
and the first time a majority 50+ years old report using social media for news.
10

The 2017 Pew survey also found an increase in usage by non-white respondents
(64 percent to 74 percent) and those with some college education or less (60
percent to 69 percent) (Shearer and Gottfried 2017).
For those that consume news online, social media has joined news
websites/apps as the most common way to find news. Of these individuals, 35
percent utilize social media as the pathway to news, while 36 percent go directly
to news websites or use news apps. (See Table 1.3) Individuals have also
formed habits around these preferred pathways. Nearly two-thirds (65 percent)
utilized the same path more than half of the times they accessed news. Of those,
social media was the most common (26 percent) and news websites/apps were
second (23 percent) (Mitchell et al. 2017). Finally, 55 percent encounter news
online while doing other things, while 44 percent are ‘seekers’ who go online to
find news (Mitchell et al. 2016).

11

Social Media and The Media Environment
Social media and traditional news sources are different, however, and
may serve different roles in the news ecosystem. While both the Internet and
social media serve to deliver news and political information, there may be
something different about how, as well as which, individuals consume and act
upon that information. One reason may be that by its nature social media is
different from traditional mass media due to the opportunity to interact with others
and self-select audiences and sources. It is more personal and allows users to
avoid traditional media gatekeepers when looking for information (Carr and
Hayes 2015; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Marichal 2012). For some types of
social media, the typical user may be different. For example, users of Twitter
have greater political interest, are more engaged and are less trusting of the
mainstream media (Bode and Dalrymple 2014).
As discussed above, another difference between social media users and
traditional news consumers is age. Younger age groups have adopted social
media as their top news source more quickly than older generations, but their
elders are catching up (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). An additional age-related
difference is source recollection. In terms of interaction with news posts, 26
percent ‘often’ and 54 percent ‘sometimes’ click story links in social media, which
means 80 percent actively click links (Mitchell et al. 2016). Although there is no
difference related to age and the likelihood of following a news link online,
younger consumers are less likely to recall the source of the news story (Mitchell
et al. 2017).
12

There may also be a difference in how people consume information from
social media due to the nature of social media itself. Twitter, for example,
restricts the number of characters in a tweet to 280, which means by its nature
the messages are short. Users have found ways around this restriction, linking to
a longer piece, tweet threads (a series of numbered consecutive tweets) or
attaching images of longer text written in another program. Generally speaking,
however, the messages are short and consumed quickly as someone scrolls
through their feed. Fast consumption while scrolling through a feed is also a
feature of other social media platforms like Facebook, while Instagram and
Snapchat rely on sending messages via photos. The quick nature of this
processing stands in contrast to a longer written news story in a newspaper or
online, and even a one-to-two minute radio or television story.
This difference in consumption may be important to any effect the
information has on the individual. Research from political science, psychology
and communication suggests that the speed with which an individual processes a
message matters to how it affects information gathering, attitudes and behavior.
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) from Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the
concept of ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ thinking and heuristics from Kahneman and Tversky
(Kahneman 2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1975, 1981), as well as work done on
political heuristics (Bartels 1996) can help understand the potential difference
between consuming information from social media and from traditional media.
The work of these academics relates to the way individuals evaluate messages
either quickly or more deliberately, making their work relevant to consumption of
13

information from social media. For example, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argue
that attitude change is more likely when information is processed via the ‘central
route’ which requires deeper thinking. If social media is processed more quickly,
by the ‘peripheral route’ in the ELM, perhaps attitude change and behavior are
not as likely to be affected.
One concern related to the growth of content options via the Internet and
social media is a greater opportunity for people to self-select content. Previous
research, related to expansion of television and cable, suggests that the increase
in choice in the media environment leads to individuals being able to self-select
entertainment over news to a greater degree. By doing so, those who choose
entertainment see less news and receive less political information (Gentzkow
2006; Prior 2005, 2007). They also reduce the likelihood of any incidental or
accidental exposure to news and political information. Prior (2005; 2007) argues
that this leads to lower voter participation among these individuals. Further, those
who choose news tend to be more partisan, which means elections become
more polarized. Prior (2005, 2007) concludes that a person’s content preference
between entertainment and news is the best predictor of whether they will turn
out to vote.
Since the rapid and significant growth of social media use in general
represents an expansion of the media environment, the increased use for news
in particular makes examining the effect this may have on political participation
important. Prior’s research is based on data from 1996, 1998 and 2000, which
was still early in the history of the Internet and well before the growth in social
14

media. While social media represents an expansion in the media environment, it
may not necessarily create the same opportunities for individuals to self-select
out of news entirely. In fact, it may create additional opportunities for incidental
exposure to such information. It may also simply act as a supplement to a
person’s main media diet and therefore not have the same effect on consumption
choice that the advent and growth of television and cable had on entertainment
and news.
An additional reason social media use may not affect political participation
is how social media fits within this expanding media environment in relation to
long-standing media sources. Chadwick (2013) proposes what he terms the
hybrid media system. He argues that anytime a new form of media is introduced
there is a period of time where we have a hybrid system. In this system, the new
media source takes on characteristics of existing media. For example, when
television was first introduced, the shows being produced were essentially
popular radio programs transferred to the screen. In fact, initial proponents of
television, like NBC’s David Sarnoff, were powerful radio people who viewed
television as an entertainment outlet. They hoped to build it in a similar manner to
AM radio with a focus on entertainment and advertising (Chadwick 2013). After a
period of time, television began to find unique ways it could tell stories and
eventually present news and information. This is when it became an important
source of political information.
The same can be seen with social media today. Much of its content is
similar to traditional media sources. Video on social media, for example, is similar
15

to stories on television. As social media ages and matures, people discover
unique ways it can present information. As time passes, producers also better
understand how audiences consume and use information presented on social
media and begin to create content that tailors to these uses. People have a
shorter attention span on social media, so video length becomes truncated, for
example. Quick, digestible content becomes the norm. Posts with images or
video get more ‘Likes’ or shares, so the growth in those types of posts increases.
The content and format of social media is always changing and adapting, as are
its audiences. Similar to the early days of television, which focused on
entertainment over news, the focus of social media today is likely to change and
not be the same as what we see in the future. Thus, at this point, we should not
expect it to affect political participation based on our understanding of traditional
news media sources.

Social Media and Political Participation
Existing studies into any relationship between social media and political
participation have presented a mix of results. There is no clear view about
whether there is a relationship, and if there is what that relationship is. Past
research has found that online news consumers do not act much differently than
those who get news from traditional sources like newspapers, radio and
television (Mitchelstein and Boczkowski 2010; Vargo et al. 2014). Bode (2016)
argues that there is “potential for users to learn political information from social
media” but that this learning “is not always realized within the general population”
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(Bode 2016, 24). Additional research has linked social media positively to
political or civic participation like contacting a politician, attending a rally or
signing a petition (Bode et al. 2014; Broockman and Green 2014; Gainous and
Wagner 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Holt et al. 2013;
Pasek, more, and Romer 2009; Vitak et al. 2011; Xenos, Vromen, and Loader
2014; Zhang, Seltzer, and Bichard 2013). These studies, however, did not
include voting in their analysis.
Studies that do examine voting have found some positive relationships
between online or social media news consumption and voter turnout (Bimber et
al. 2014; Bimber and Copeland 2013; Bode 2012; Bond et al. 2012; Gainous and
Wagner 2014). Others find little to no link between social media consumption and
political participation, but these also did not include voting (Broockman and
Green 2014; Dimitrova and Bystrom 2013; Green and Gerber 2015; Kushin and
Yamamoto 2010). The relatively new nature of social media as a tool could
account for some of the differences. As it ages, more and more people are
adopting it as a source of information, in particular younger generations. For
example, the five studies on social media which included voting and found a
positive relationship were all published from 2012 on and looked at elections
since 2010.
An additional way that social media and traditional media are different is
the greater ability of consumers to self-select from whom they receive
information. This ability started with the growth of cable news and the Internet
(Gainous and Wagner 2014; Prior 2007). Again, similar to studies into social
17

media and political participation, the results have been mixed. Some research
has examined the potential social media allows for people to create information
echo chambers as opposed to being exposed to new and opposing information.
Some believe it does create an echo chamber and limit exposure to new and
opposing information (Gainous and Wagner 2014; Marichal 2012; Messing and
Westwood 2012; Sunstein 2009). Others argue that social networks are not
ideologically driven, increase the opportunity to be exposed to novel or new
information, and are more likely to spread information (Bakshy et al. 2012;
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011; Kim 2011). One explanation for the differences in
opinion between these academics is that those who are concerned about echo
chambers are basing their views on how individual’s act in non-social media
communication situations. Because people tend to consume information from
ideologically similar sources offline and in some situations on the Internet, it will
likely be true for social media as well. At the very least, the potential exists.
Those who have specifically examined the issue, however, have not found this to
be the case or have found it to be limited because of the opportunity for
incidental exposure to opposing views.

Social Media and the 2016 Presidential Election
The 2016 U.S. Presidential election introduced new issues related to
social media and elections. In addition, with increased use of a variety of
platforms there was greater focus on social media and political participation. The
2016 election featured the aggressive use of Twitter by Donald Trump, concerns
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over ‘fake news’ being distributed and shared on social media like Facebook and
Twitter, and the use of social media by groups outside the United States to
attempt to influence the outcome of the election. First, and most noticeable
during the election itself, was the extensive use of Twitter by Donald Trump. The
tactic allowed Trump to bypass any gatekeeping from the media and directly
address the general population. His messages, however, reached even further
than Twitter, as the media would invariably pick up his tweets and repost, write
about or broadcast them along with commentary or analysis. This extended the
reach of these messages to Americans who were not on Twitter or did not follow
Trump on Twitter if they were users of the service. Because his comments on
Twitter pushed the boundaries of typical statements by presidential candidates,
the media actively covered them and increased their reach. Recall from the data
presented above that only 24 percent of U.S. adults are on Twitter, which places
it near the bottom on the list of major platforms. This is what set his use of Twitter
apart from the use by his opponents in the Primary Election and by Hillary Clinton
in the General Election. All of these candidates and their campaigns utilized
Twitter as well. It was Trump’s provocative content, the additional coverage by
the traditional media, and responses from others that amplified his messages
even more.
Second, the 2016 election raised concerns about the ability of social
media sites like Facebook and Twitter to spread false and misleading
information. Early research on social media and the 2016 election questions the
conventional view that social media had a big effect on the campaign. For
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example, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) examined web referral data combined with
a post-election survey via SurveyMonkey’s Audience Panel. The results present
an interesting first look at the potential effect of ‘fake news’ on political decisions.
First, they found “a meaningful rate of false recall” for placebo articles. In fact,
recall for these was the same as for the fake news headlines (Allcott and
Gentzkow 2017, 12). They argue that this suggests that respondents overstate
their true recall of fake news which was likely lower. Second, they determined
that social media was not the top source of election news. Third, the most
circulated fake news stories were still only seen by “a small fraction of
Americans” (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, 22). Finally, for these stories to have
had an effect on the election outcome it would have required 0.7 percent of
Clinton voters and non-voters to shift to Trump. This, they argue, is “a persuasion
rate equivalent to seeing 36 television campaign ads” (Allcott and Gentzkow
2017, 22).
Additional research since the election has quantified how much ‘fake
news’ people may have seen and has examined the characteristics of those
viewers. Guess, Nyhan and Reifler (2018) utilized browser history data from
2,525 Americans which was collected anonymously by YouGov with their
permission. Their analysis estimates that one-in-four Americans viewed a fake
news story but that overall it was a very small part of their news diet. Among
Clinton supporters, for example, it amounted to only one percent, while for Trump
supporters it was six percent. Two results of particular interest relate to the
political knowledge of these news consumers as well as the amount of hard news
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they contribute. The research team determined that there was no evidence to
support the contention that fake news was consumed only by those with less
political knowledge. Fake news consumers were also heavy consumers of hard
news, making the fake news just a small part of their overall news diet. “These
results suggest that fake news doesn’t crowd out hard news consumption”
(Guess, Nyhan and Reifler 2018, S24).
Finally, revelations in fall 2017 that Russian interests created fake
accounts and purchased ads on Facebook, Instagram and Google in an attempt
to sway the election in favor of Donald Trump led to congressional hearings and
fact finding. Twitter announced that more than 2,700 accounts were controlled by
Russians along with more than 36,000 bots posting automatically. In total, these
accounts posted more than 1.4 million times during the presidential election.
Facebook revealed that up to 126 million users may have been exposed to this
information as well as other content produced by Russian operatives (Timberg
and Dwoskin 2017). The number is staggering, yet the question remains whether
or not seeing that information had an influence on the voting decision made by
those who viewed it. For example, Patrick Ruffini, co-founder of the Republicanleaning Echelon Insights digital ad firm and a long-time campaign expert, called
the advertising “a laughably botched and failed attempt” to impact the election
outcome (Ruffini 2017). He noted that even if the Russian-sponsored advertising
reached 126 million Americans, the content reflected a very small share of the 33
trillion posts that Americans were exposed to on their Facebook timelines
between 2015 and 2017. Further, the amount spent on the ads, approximately
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$100,000.00, was less than is typically spent on competitive congressional races
(Ruffini 2017).
The explanations of reach and potential effect described above are not
meant to excuse the improper meddling of a foreign power in U.S. elections or
the inappropriate use of technology to influence an election. Rather, they further
demonstrate the need to better understand how U.S. citizens are accessing news
and political information via social media and whether that information effects the
vote decision. While this dissertation does not address these issues directly, it
does examine more fundamental questions about whether social media has an
effect on political knowledge and voter turnout. In doing so, it provides important
context to the more specific questions around the potential effect of fake news,
bots that promote specific stories, and even advertising campaigns on social
media. These attempts during the 2016 election are salacious, and rightfully so. It
is wise for us to take a step back and better understand the most fundamental
questions about the relationship between the consumption of information from
social media and political decision-making because that relationship at this point
is still not clear.
During the past 10 years, we have seen a significant change in the way
people access and consume news and information. The rapid growth in social
media doesn’t appear to be slowing down. Social media has changed how news
and information is received as well as who is receiving information from different
sources. In addition, its use for news and political information is spreading from
younger generations to older ones. Since information is a key component to
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decision-making, it is important to understand what effect this change may have
on democracy and the political process. With these changes, we are seeing
social media being used to attempt to influence our elections in new ways, from
spreading intentionally false stories, to politicians using it to bypass the traditional
gatekeeping roles of the press.
At the same time, our understanding of the most basic questions about
social media’s effect on political decision-making is not clear. The link between
news and information via traditional media and increased odds an individual will
vote is established in the academic research. Whether social media acts in a
similar role in a positive manner is still not. The natural tendency is to assume it
does, which leads to assumptions about the effect of social media in general. It
also focuses attention on exciting and potentially controversial uses and abuses
like we saw in the 2016 election. The base question about the effect of social
media on political participation and knowledge, however, is still unclear. Is this
new expansion of the media environment giving people greater opportunity to
self-select content and avoid news, and is this affecting political knowledge and
voter turnout? Does social media act like traditional news media sources, like
newspapers, radio, television and the Internet by delivering news and political
information and increasing the odds people turnout to vote? These fundamental
questions are important to understand because they will help inform more
specific questions about the attempted use of social media for persuasion or
even more nefarious uses like propaganda. This dissertation examines the
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fundamental relationship between social media, news and political information,
and if social media have an impact on the odds an individual will turn out to vote.

Structure of dissertation
Thus far, this introductory chapter has presented the current landscape
with regard to the development and use of social media. With this background in
place, the next step is an overview of the chapters to come and how these will
help examine the role social media may play in the political process.
In Chapter 2, the existing literature around social media, news and political
participation is examined. This helps understand the research which has been
done to date, how that research builds a base for the examinations in the rest of
the dissertation, and what questions remain unanswered related to social media
and political habits, such as voting. As noted above, results have been mixed
with some research finding a relationship between social media use, political
participation and voting while other research has found little to no link. Over the
period of time covered by this research, however, social media use as a news
and information source has grown dramatically as more and more people adopt it
(Mitchell et al. 2016; Purcell and Rainie 2014; Shearer and Gottfried 2017).
Research into the similarities between traditional news consumers and
individuals that rely on social media for information is also examined to see how
these people are similar and different. Finally, Chapter 2 also looks at the
literature around decision-making in general, and political decision-making in
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specific, to provide context for why consumption of news and information from
social media may be different than from traditional news sources.
In Chapter 3, descriptive statistics are used to examine the differences
between social media users and traditional news users with regard to
demographics, and their habits and attitudes related to government and politics.
This lays additional groundwork for understanding the effect this new information
source may have on the decision to turnout to vote. Chapter 3 investigates these
differences by comparing three groups. The groups are those that prefer social
media, those that prefer traditional news sources, and those preferring both
equally. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES)
survey, respondents are divided into three groups. Two questions from this
survey allow the creation of these groups. First, respondents were asked “During
a typical week, how many days do you use social media such as Twitter and
Facebook?” Second, they were asked “During a typical week, how many days do
you watch, read, or listen to news on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the
Internet, not including sports?” It is important to note the difference in emphasis
of these two questions. The social media question asks about social media use
in general, while the traditional news media question asks about news
specifically. Using responses from these two questions, respondents are sorted
into three groups:
● Prefers Social Media: These respondents spend more days per week
with social media than with traditional news media.
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● Prefers Traditional Media: This group is made up of respondents who
engage more with traditional news media during the week than with social
media.
● Prefers Both Equally: This group contains respondents who said they
accessed social media the same number of days they accessed traditional
news media.

The groups are compared first across a series of demographics, including
age, sex, education level, and party affiliation. Next, they are compared across a
series of questions related to attitudes about government and politics, including
political knowledge, trust in government and level of partisanship. Finally, the
groups are compared on political habits, including level of civic participation and
voter turnout.
Based on the results of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and the
investigation in Chapter 3, hypotheses are developed to examine two related
issues. The first is whether the increase in media choice created by social media
further allows individuals to self-select out of news by consuming primarily
entertainment, and if this is related to political knowledge and voter turnout. The
second is the relationship between the use of social media and the likelihood an
individual will turn out to vote.
In Chapter 4, the first research study repeats part of Prior’s (2005, 2007)
research on the increase in media choice and its effect on political knowledge
and the likelihood of voting. A key contention Prior examines in both his journal
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article (2005) and his book (2007) is that the increasing number of options in the
media environment allow people to self-select out of news and only consume
entertainment. This self-selection of entertainment versus news preference, he
concludes, is the best predictor of whether they will turn out to vote. News
consumers vote more often, while entertainment viewers vote less. Prior used
ANES 1996 and 2000 data for a part of his study for the 2005 journal article.
Chapter 4 completes the study using 2016 data to see how news versus
entertainment consumers turnout with this new information source available to
them, one that allows for incidental news exposure. As two other recent studies
suggest, even a small increase in exposure to news has the potential for
increasing political participation (Bimber et al. 2014; Ksiazek, Malthouse, and
Webster 2010).
Since Prior’s study was completed before the explosive growth of social
media, an additional media channel capable of delivering news and
entertainment, social media may provide accidental news exposure for
entertainment choosers and have an impact on both political knowledge and the
likelihood they vote. Some research since the Prior study has supported the idea
of social media as a source of accidental news, even from viewpoints with which
one might disagree (Bakshy et al. 2012; Bimber et al. 2014; Gentzkow and
Shapiro 2011; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012; Kim 2011; Ksiazek,
Malthouse, and Webster 2010; Mitchell et al. 2013). While this dissertation does
not look specifically at the issue of incidental news exposure, the results of the
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study in Chapter 4 will provide important information to guide further examination
of this topic.
In Chapter 5, we turn to the question of whether the use of social media
can predict whether an individual turns out to vote. Past research indicates that
individuals who consume traditional news media like TV, radio and newspapers
are more likely participate in politics, including the act of voting (Gil de Zúñiga,
Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Luskin 1990; Popkin 1994; Prior 2007; Zaller 1992).
This dissertation study looks at whether consumption of social media acts in a
similar manner by increasing the odds that an individual votes. Understanding
whether or not exposure to news via social media increases the likelihood of
voting is important. First, it goes to a central question outlined in the introduction
about whether information delivered via social media is having an effect on
political participation. Many of the heightened concerns resulting from the 2016
election assume it does. Second, on the positive side, if social media does
deliver political information it could serve as a substitute for information from
traditional media. For example, younger voters tend to turn out in lower numbers
than older voters. If these voters are able to access political information via social
media, and this increases their odds of turning out to vote, it would be a positive
outcome for democratic participation.
Data for this study comes from the 2016 ANES, which asked respondents
pre-election if they intended to vote and followed up post-election to ask if they in
fact voted. In terms of social media consumption, the question described above
in Chapter 3 regarding how often people consumed social media is utilized. The
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study controls for news consumption from non-social media sources like
newspaper, television, radio and the Internet. This is included in the regression
models to improve estimates of the relationship between the consumption of
social media and voting by controlling for any relationship from traditional news
sources. When used in a logistic regression model, controls allow a more precise
examination of the effect of the variable of interest on the dependent variable
above any effect from the variables being controlled.
The approach the ANES survey took in their question on traditional news
use, by combining all news sources (traditional, online and social media), also fits
with the ‘hybrid media system’ idea proffered by Chadwick (2013) and described
briefly above. His argument is that as new media sources and technologies are
introduced, they overlap with existing sources and have characteristics of those
sources. So, for example, with social media we still see the inclusion of video
stories on social media (like television) and links to news articles written by
newspapers, magazines and other new media sources. In addition, it addresses
some of the criticism put forward by Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2010),
specifically that the tendency has been to examine news sources in isolation
from one another, an artifact they argue of research into traditional media.
In the final chapter, insights and conclusions gleaned from the dissertation
are synthesized to better understand the central question of the relationship
between social media use and an individual’s political participation. Specifically,
the dissertation concludes that social media use is not related to voter turnout in
either a positive or negative manner, while traditional news media use continues
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to be related to voting. This includes when social media access is considered
along with an individual’s content preference. Specific limitations are discussed
along with recommendations for how these limitations could be mitigated in
future studies. Finally, based on the results and analysis from the paper,
suggestions are presented for future research that builds on these results or
reexamines questions and issues raised by this paper. Primary among these are
studies looking at social media as it relates to a voter’s age, the amount of
exposure to news and political information needed to spur participation, and how
information gathered from social media, along with the source of such
information, is recalled by the user.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature

In a democracy, voting plays an important role as a way for citizens to
participate in governing. In addition to providing the ability to select our
representatives, voting allows people to signal policy preferences and express
public opinion, and in some cases to even directly enact new laws (Dahl 2006;
Gainous and Wagner 2014; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Przeworski
1999; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). For elected officials, voting provides
legitimacy and authority to rule, and provides political opponents the assurance
that the opportunity exists to replace those in power via elections (Manin,
Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Przeworski and Stokes 1999). Many factors
influence an individual’s decision to participate in elections. For example, a
voter’s age has been found to affect a person’s decision to vote, with turnout
increasing generally as age increases (Smets and van Ham 2013; Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980). In a similar way, education affects turnout. Those with more
education vote more often than those with less (Leighly and Vedlitz 1999; Smets
and van Ham 2013). Finally, political knowledge, a sense of civic duty and
political interest have all been found to positively affect turnout. The more people
know and care about politics the more likely they are to participate (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996; Downs 1957; Geys 2006; Leighly and Vedlitz 1999; Luskin
1990; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Prior 2007; Smets and van Ham
2013; Zaller 1992).
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In government and politics, exposure to news and political information is
widely accepted as a necessary component to forming public opinion and
increasing political participation (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng 2014;
Luskin 1990; Popkin 1994; Prior 2007; Zaller 1992). It helps citizens make
decisions, choose representatives and understand if the government is
representing their interests (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Downs 1957; Manin,
Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). Being informed leads to greater participation in
political life, but it also requires engaged citizens (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997).
Downs (1957) argues that people will not spend precious time seeking out
information about politics but instead will rely on receiving information
accidentally from sources like family, friends, co-workers and the media.
Research has supported the positive relationship between exposure or access to
news from traditional sources, like newspapers, television and radio, with turning
out to vote (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gentzkow
2006; Gil de Zuniga, Jung and Valenzuela 2012; Popkin 1994; Prior 2007; Smets
and Van Ham 2013). This positive relationship is less clear for a new form of
news delivery, social media. Research during the past 10 years into whether use
of social media for news and political information increases political participation
and voter participation has been mixed. Some studies find a positive relationship
(Bimber et al. 2014; Bimber and Copeland 2013; Bode 2012; Bode et al. 2014;
Bond et al. 2012; Broockman and Green 2014; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gil
de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Holt et al. 2013; Pasek, more, and
Romer 2009; Vitak et al. 2011; Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014; Zhang,
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Seltzer, and Bichard 2013) while others do not (Bimber et al. 2014; Broockman
and Green 2014; Dimitrova and Bystrom 2013; Green and Gerber 2015; Kushin
and Yamamoto 2010; Towner 2013).
How a person processes information may also have an effect on news
choices and how they, in turn, are motivated to act on on the information they
receive. Researchers across several disciplines have developed similar models
related to how people receive and process information for both political and
nonpolitical purposes (Bartels 1996; Kahneman 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, and
Tversky 1982; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Petty and
Cacioppo 1986). They have identified several heuristics people use, and biases
that result from that use, which affect decision-making. In political science
research, the idea of political heuristics has been identified as a way people can
use cues to help make decisions, instead of having to fully understand a policy or
candidate’s position on issues (Bartels 1996; Kulinski and Quirk 2000; Lau and
Redlawsk 2001). Examining each of these approaches provides a different
foundation for understanding how information delivered via social media may
affect an individual’s decisions.
This literature review lays the groundwork for examining whether social
media have an impact on an individual’s likelihood of turning out to vote. It begins
by examining the research on voting in general and the various factors that
influence the decision to participate in an election. Next, it discusses the role of
information in the decision-making process. Specifically, it looks at the role of the
traditional media as an information source and its relationship to voter turnout. It
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examines several concepts related to how individuals process information and
discusses the role this may play in the differences between traditional media and
social media as sources of news and political information. It then looks at
research during the past 10 years and the mixed results related to social media
as an information source, as well as its relationship to political participation and
voting. Finally, it outlines research that suggests the increase in media options
has led to greater political polarization and lower voter participation.

Importance of Voting to Democracy
Stripped down to its most basic terms, democracy is simply that “rulers are
elected” (Przeworski 1999). This is done through elections where citizens have
the ability to choose representatives and change leadership (Dahl 2006; Gainous
and Wagner 2014; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Przeworski 1999;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Elections also give our representatives the
authority to rule and assures opponents - those who lost the election - that the
opportunity for change in the future exists (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999;
Przeworski and Stokes 1999). In terms of legitimacy for democracy, the presence
of competitive elections is the most basic indicator. Przeworski calls this “the
miracle of democracy” because “conflicting political forces obey the results of
voting” (Przeworski 1999, 5). Further, Clucas and Valdini argue that meaningful
elections provide a method for expressing opinion, help inform politicians, and
give voters choices (Clucas and Valdini 2015).
Once in power, officials pursue policies designed, first and foremost, to
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maximize votes, an additional indicator of the importance of voting. Their job is to
make sure voters are aware of the benefits they receive from the policies the
elected official supports and enacts. After all, voters are self-interested but on
Election Day can only consider government benefits they know about (Downs
1957). In addition, one method for examining whether an election is meaningful is
to look at how many citizens turn out to vote. Clucas and Valdini (2015) argue
that voters choosing not to vote is an indication of a breakdown in communication
and “one way to conceptualize meaningfulness” (75).
There are other aspects of participation in a democracy. Writing letters,
online activism and protesting, for example, are ways citizens indicate opinions
and preferences to elected officials. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) describe the
difference between focusing on a simple measure, like voting, and a more
complex list of participation features as thin and thick definitions of citizenship.
Research into political participation has been adding new features over the past
two decades. With technological changes, like the Internet and social media,
academics seem compelled to add new methods of participation, like online
petitions, blogging or political social media posts. Their attempt broadens the
definition enough to capture more people in the participation net (Bode et al.
2014; Broockman and Green 2014; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gil de Zúñiga,
Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Holt et al. 2013; Pasek, more, and Romer 2009;
Tang and Lee 2013; Vitak et al. 2011; Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014; Zhang,
Seltzer, and Bichard 2013). The general interest of this dissertation is on the
basic, core behavior in a democracy: voting. It is the most important value of
35

democracy, as described above. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) call voting
“the easiest political act” and “the least demanding form of political activity”
(Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995, 282–83).

Information and Political Decision-Making
Anthony Downs (1957) argues that the first step a voter takes is to gather
information about issues or candidates. Information is a key component of the
decision-making process, and for a voter to know why and how they should vote,
they need information (Downs 1957). Access and exposure to political
information via news and the media is generally accepted as important to political
participation as well as helping the public form opinions on civic issues (Gil de
Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Luskin 1990; Popkin 1994; Prior 2007;
Zaller 1990). This helps individuals make political decisions, like choosing
representatives or even enacting legislation through the initiative process. It also
helps them understand whether government is representing their interests and
responding to their preferences (Downs 1957; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996;
Manin et al 1999). As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) state, “…democracy
functions best when its citizens are politically informed” (1). Political information
and knowledge are two of the most important factors that affects voter turnout.
Individuals who are more knowledgeable about government, politics and how it
works are more likely to turn out to vote (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Downs
1957; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Prior 2007).
This participation, though, requires citizens to be “active and engaged”
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according to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996). Downs (1957), however, argues
that individuals will not seek out this information but instead rely on receiving it as
a by-product from friends and family, from non-political activities, and from the
media. Samuel Popkin, in The Reasoning Voter (1994), relies on the by-product
concept from Downs to explain how voters get information. In what he calls “lowinformation rationality,” voters combine “in an economical way, learning and
information from past experiences, daily life, the media, and political campaigns”
(Popkin 1994, 7).
Luskin (1990) believes a person’s political sophistication, their political
knowledge, is contingent on three things: information, ability, and motivation. One
must first be exposed to the information, then have the ability to understand it,
and finally have the motivation or “reason enough to make the effort” to process it
(Luskin 1990, 335). He has very little faith in the ability of the broadcast media to
deliver proper exposure, calling broadcast news “brief and shallow” (Luskin 1990,
335). Based on previous research, he believes newspapers are far better at
delivering information that is retained by individuals. Luskin concludes that
exposure to information is not the biggest challenge, rather is it motivation and
ability to understand and organize it. “Sophistication, in these results, is much
less a function of the information to which people are exposed than of what they
can and are motivated to make of it” (Luskin 1990, 352).
John Zaller’s (1992) model for public opinion formation provides another
way to look at the role information plays in the political process. Zaller says there
are two key components to opinion formation: information and predisposition. He
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notes that people can never know all the information about an issue and so we
rely on snippets of information from family, friends and the media. This is similar
to Downs (1957) and Popkin (1994). Further, Zaller says this information comes
down from political elites - politicians, journalists etc. - and comes second or third
hand. “Even when we learn from friends or family members about some aspect
of public affairs, often we may still be secondhand consumers of ideas that
originated more distantly among some type of elite” (Zaller 1992, 6). Awareness
of politics by the general public varies greatly from person to person. In addition,
“the average overall levels of information are quite low” (Zaller 1992, 18). This is
important because too often researchers build models about political behavior
that assume an equal and higher level of awareness by individuals. Any look at
political information and how it interacts with politics needs to recognize that the
level of awareness is, in fact, very small. “More succinctly, there is a high
variance in political awareness around a generally low mean” (Zaller 1992, 18).
These approaches are similar to the two-step flow of information model
established by Katz (1957) whereby political elites and the media serve as
sources of political information and thus affect what is presented and how it is
framed. This means systems that deliver information are important to the process
of democracy because they provide what people know and how they understand
what they know (Bennett 2011; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Williams and Delli
Carpini 2011). Traditional media, like newspapers, television and radio, affect
what citizens think about and how they judge public officials and the government
by focusing and framing issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). The advent of social
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media has changed the traditional gatekeeping role of the media and allows
citizens to gather and disseminate information in an entirely new way. This raises
questions about whether social media acts in a similar manner as traditional
media, and thus if existing theories and models can be applied. Agenda setting,
for example, is one area researchers are examining. Utilizing concepts from
Katz’s (1957) two-step flow of information model along with concepts from
agenda setting research, Feezell (2017) found that agenda-setting effects could
be delivered via social media. Further, she found that such effects were
particularly strong for those with lower political interest who received the
information incidentally (Feezell 2017). Understanding the potential relationships
between social media and political participation and decision-making is therefore
important.
There are questions around the connection between political knowledge
and citizen participation, particularly, how research has measured political
knowledge and whether this captures what is intended. Looking specifically at the
judicial branch of government, Gibson and Caldeira (2009) argue that increased
access to information about courts and judicial confirmations due to coverage by
cable news served to increase the role of ordinary citizens in the judicial process.
Further, exposure to this information has helped solidify the legitimacy of the
judicial branch. Most importantly, through their analysis Gibson and Caldeira are
far more positive about the political knowledge of the general United States
citizen, in particular related to the courts. They argue that existing measurement
techniques using open-ended questions are not accurately measuring such
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knowledge. In fact, they demonstrate that closed-ended multiple-choice
questions produce a better measurement.
Gibson and Caldeira take specific aim at how the American National
Election Study (ANES) measures political knowledge by asking what people
know about specific political and judicial figures, like the Supreme Court Chief
Justice, Speaker of the House and Vice President. The survey presents these
individual’s names without context and asks respondents what job or position
they hold. Further, the ANES is very strict about what they consider accurate
answers. Using the 2004 ANES as an example, respondents were asked about
William Rehnquist, then Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Through
correspondence with ANES, Gibson and Caldeira learned that the only answer
considered accurate was ‘Chief Justice’ or ‘Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.’
Simply saying ‘Justice’ was considered incorrect, as was saying ‘Court’ and not
‘Supreme Court’ (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). By comparison, during the 2006
Samuel Alito confirmation, Gibson and Caldeira tested an open-ended approach
versus a closed-ended multiple choice approach to a similar question. Only
seven percent of respondents who received the open-ended question could
identify John Roberts as the chief justice. Among those who received a list of
three choices, however, 46.3 percent were able to correctly identify Roberts as
the chief justice. Similar results were found with questions about the Senate
Majority Leader and former Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
Use of measurements of political knowledge from the ANES, then, should
be limited to “only the simplest and grossest inferences” (Gibson and Caldeira
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2009, 23). Thus, as you will see in Chapter 3, political knowledge measurements
are used only as one of several descriptive measures comparing those who
prefer traditional media to those who prefer social media for news and
information. In addition, the study in Chapter 4 uses it as one of two
measurements to examine the relationship between the media environment and
politics.

Heuristics as Information Shortcuts
As described above, models developed to understand political
participation, whether via voting or public opinion, rely on the input of information.
It makes sense that in order to form an opinion or make a decision at the ballot
box, people must have some information about the issue or candidate. As Zaller
(1992) argues, levels of knowledge related to politics are quite low, however. It is
important to note that Zaller utilized questions from ANES surveys over the years
and to keep in mind the criticism of this approach explained above by Gibson and
Caldeira (2009). Still, based on the general belief that political knowledge by
Americans was lacking, political scientists attempted to acknowledge that, and at
the same time understand how (and why) people make political decisions. To do
this, they turned to heuristics as a possible explanation. Heuristics are mental
shortcuts an individual uses to make decisions. Based on research into the use
of heuristics, Kahneman (2011) writes that “The technical definition of heuristic is
a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to
difficult questions” (98).
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A 1996 study by Larry Bartels argues that heuristics do not achieve the
goals of an informed electorate and in fact can lead to specific biases that benefit
certain candidates. Bartels sought to directly examine the belief that information
shortcuts allow voters to act “as if they were fully informed” (Bartels 1996, 194).
He points out that while political scientists rely on this idea, very little had been
done to empirically test whether it was true. Using data from the American
National Election Survey from the 1972 presidential election through the 1992
presidential election, Bartels created hypothetical “fully informed” vote
probabilities and found that shortcuts do not allow voters to act as if fully
informed. In fact, he was able to identify specific biases that benefit certain types
of candidates. In his analysis, Democratic candidates received a two percentage
point advantage and incumbents did five percentage points better than with a
hypothetical fully-informed electorate (Bartels 1996).
Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) point out that in response to low voter
knowledge of politics, political scientists generally offer two explanations. The
first relies on heuristics and the second is that political opinion ends up being
rational because individual errors tend to cancel each other out. In the field of
political science, researchers have identified several types of heuristics that may
be useful to voters. These include items like party label, the demographics of the
candidate and her supporters, the idea that the candidate’s personal character
reflects the candidate’s political character, and public statements by politicians as
well as interest groups. Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) argue that citizens regularly
fail to use these political heuristics at all. First, people do use heuristics but not in
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a thoughtful manner, rather they use them automatically and without regard to
accuracy. Second, people lack the context to use heuristics properly. For
example, a political heuristic noted as typical by Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) is
judging the viability of a candidate based on their success in early primary states.
They argue that in order for a voter to properly use this heuristic they must
understand the particular nuances of the early primary states, like whether it is
conservative or liberal. With political knowledge being so low, voters likely lack
this information and thus do not use the heuristic properly or simply do not use it
at all. Finally, the information needed by the voter to use a heuristic might not be
available to them. Consider a politician’s statements or the position of an interest
group. If a voter does not have this information, it cannot be used as a heuristic
for easier decision-making. In the end, Kuklinski and Quirk explain that they are
not against heuristics, rather they question the generally positive light they are
put in by researchers and whether voters, in fact, can become competent through
the use of heuristics.
In 2001, Lau and Redlawsk continued the examination of whether
heuristics actually work to help mitigate the lack of voter knowledge. Heuristics in
political decision making have become so popular, they argue, that the idea can
been seen as “new conventional wisdom” (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 952). Their
study, however, found heuristics to only be valuable to those voters who already
possessed high political knowledge. For low-information voters, on the other
hand, heuristics actually made decision making less accurate (Lau and Redlawsk
2001).
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A contemporary change in how people are receiving political information
provides a new opportunity to consider the potential ramifications of heuristics on
political decision-making. If people with low political knowledge rely on social
media for news and political information, and use heuristics to process this
information, it may affect their decision-making. Take, for example, the
opportunity to create information echo chambers. Prior (2007) argues that more
media choice allows greater opportunity to self-select the information one
receives. Some believe this could allow people to only consume information they
agree with and to avoid information that challenges their worldview (Gainous and
Wagner 2014; Marichal 2012; Sunstein 2009). Other researchers do not see this
as a potential problem because, they argue, the Internet and social media
actually create greater opportunities to be exposed to new and alternative
opinions, as well as to spread information (Bakshy et al. 2012; Gentzkow and
Shapiro 2011; Kim 2011).
Gainous and Wagner (2014) argue that because social media allows an
individual to decide who they want to friend or follow, ideological echo chambers,
or one-sided information flow as they describe it, is the likely result. Since this
has been the case with other traditional media and the Internet they “...have no
reason to expect selectivity to be different when deciding which information to
consume via social media” (Gainous and Wagner 2014, 122). At the same time,
they acknowledge that, at the point of their writing, there was little research
related to content choice and social media. Sunstein (2009) makes a similar
argument to suggest echo chambers may occur. His view is based not on the
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results of studies specific to social media but rather by relating it to how people
consume information from other sources. In fact, he acknowledges that research
has shown that echo chambers are not necessarily more likely for those with
access to the Internet than for those without. Basing his view on simply access to
the Internet also demonstrates how much the online world has changed since he
developed his opinion. Finally, Marichal (2012) also bases his concern for the
potential for echo chambers on the past political behavior of individuals offline.
He suggests that platforms like Facebook groups will only encourage and expand
this behavior because it makes it so much easier.
Studies that have sought to examine the question directly, however, have
found different results. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), for example, found that
online ideological segregation was low overall. Further, it was significantly lower
than the ideological segregation people develop in face-to-face relationships and
social networks. It was higher, however, than the segregation that occurs from
consumption of offline newspapers. They attribute these results to the fact that
online news consumers visit multiple sites online and that, at the time of their
research, the Internet news ecosystem was dominated by large and relatively
moderate news sites. Finally, they found that users who do visit sites that cater to
a specific ideological slant are also heavy consumers of news in general and are
thus being exposed to moderate or even different viewpoints.
Bakshy et al. (2012) examined Facebook friend networks and its news
feed algorithm to see if the potential for echo chambers was present. They
concluded that a person’s existing friend network, not the algorithm or the
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individual’s consumption choices, were more likely to cause a potential echo
chamber. Still, they were positive in their conclusion about the potential for
exposure to ideologically different viewpoints on social media. “Our work shows
that social media exposes individuals to at least some ideologically cross-cutting
viewpoints” (Bakshy et al. 2012, 1131). Messing and Westwood (2014) suggest
that it is the endorsement of news from our social network online that most
influences a decision to consume it. Thus, a person may be more likely to
engage with content outside their normal partisan views because of such an
endorsement. These social endorsements helped reduce an individual’s partisan
content choice decisions.
The reliance on heuristics may also contribute to the latest concern related
to social media and politics: ‘fake news’. In the wake of the 2016 election, people
are concerned about the ability of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to
spread false and misleading information. The issue is whether this information
could sway an election to one candidate over another. To examine this, Allcott
and Gentzkow (2017) used web referral data combined with a post-election
survey. Part of this survey presented respondents with 15 news headlines about
the election and asked them if they recalled seeing or hearing about them. They
also asked if the headline was true. The 15 news headlines were randomly
chosen from a database created by the research team that included true and
false news headlines that appeared during the election. These were evenly
weighted to include stories beneficial and harmful to both presidential candidates.
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It also included ‘placebo’ headlines the researchers made up so that it was
possible to swap in either candidate’s name (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017).
The results present an interesting first look at the potential effect of ‘fake
news’ on political decisions. First, they found “a meaningful rate of false recall”
for the placebo articles (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, 12). In fact, recall for the
placebo headlines was the same as for the false news headlines that actually
appeared during the election. This suggests respondents overstate their true
recall of fake news, which was likely lower. Second, they determined that social
media was not their top source of election news. Third, the most circulated fake
news stories were still only seen by “a small fraction of Americans” (Allcott and
Gentzkow 2017, 22). Finally, for these stories to have affected the election result
it would have required 0.7 percent of Clinton voters and nonvoters to shift to
Trump (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Thus, despite the concerns over the issue of
fake news being a prevelant storyline from the 2016 election, the effect of those
stories appears to be minimal at best.

Factors Affecting Voter Turnout
Chapter 3 of this dissertation uses descriptive statistics to examine the
similarities and differences between those who prefer traditional media for news
and information and people who prefer social media. Previous research has
found several factors affecting why people turnout to vote. Two of the three most
studied variables related to voter turnout are education level and age. In a metaanalysis of studies conducted between 2000 and 2010, which examined
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individual-level voter turnout in national elections, Smets and van Ham (2013)
found that 67 out of the 90 studies included education as a variable and 65
included age. Their analysis indicates support for a statistically significant effect
between more education and higher voter turnout. Leighly and Vedlitz (1999)
found education was also a factor positively related to turnout in their study of
voters in Texas, and that the factor remained positive across four major ethnic
groups. The same was true for age, where turnout increases as one gets older
(Smets and van Ham 2013). The studies looking at age did find that turnout
begins to decline at an older age, most likely due to a general withdrawal from
social life by the elderly, so the effect is in fact curvilinear. This meta-analysis of
recent studies confirms the original results by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980)
in their seminal work, Who Votes?, which also identified education and age as
key factors for voter turnout.
The ‘resource model’ of political participation developed by Brady, Verba
and Scholzman (1995) sought to improve on simply relying on socio-economic
factors like income, education and occupation. The resource model includes
items like time, money and civic skills. This model was developed to help explain
additional ways voters gain political knowledge, which as demonstrated above is
important to voter turnout. For example, Brady, Verba and Scholzman (1995)
explain how civic skills gained from participation in non-political community
organizations, like churches, are valuable for increasing participation in politics.
Using the resource frame, Verba et al. (1993) also identified the availability of
political resources as being the most important factor when comparing
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participation of African-Americans, Latinos, and Anglo-Americans, not the race of
the individual. Other factors, similar to civic participation, have been examined
and found to positively affect turnout, including past turnout, the propensity to
vote and a sense of civic duty and caring who wins (Geys 2006; Smets and van
Ham 2013). Psychological factors, like civic duty and political interest, have also
been found to be predictors of political participation across multiple racial and
ethnic groups. Leighly and Vedlitz (1999), for example, found these to be strong
predictors for Asian-Americans, African-Americans, Mexican-Americans and
whites in their study of voters in Texas. Finally, Geys (2006) in his meta-analysis
of 83 aggregate-level studies on turnout found that “voting may be habit-forming”
(646) based on statistically significant results for seven of the eight studies he
examined that looked at previous turnout.
Social Media versus Traditional News
A key way that people develop interest and gain knowledge about politics
is via the media. Media exposure is generally accepted as important for
increasing political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Gainous and
Wagner 2014; Gentzkow 2006; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012;
Popkin 1994; Prior 2007; Smets and van Ham 2013). The nature of the media
system that delivers this information, therefore, has an effect on voter turnout.
Prior (2007) argues that the media environment is a key consideration and the
best predictor of voter turnout. He found that greater media choice has allowed
greater opportunity to self-select out of exposure to news and political
information, allowing entertainment choosers to avoid it altogether. The result is
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that those most interested in news and politics, who are more partisan by nature,
turn out to vote, leading to polarization in our political system (Prior 2007). The
issue of self-selection out of news and political information due to increased
media choice is a key contention this dissertation will examine and is discussed
in greater detail below.
There are differences between traditional media and social media as
information sources. These differences may mean that traditional media and
social media play different roles in the media ecosystem. Further, there may be
differences in how individuals process information from these sources. In
addition, users vary by social media platform in some situations. Twitter users,
for example, have been found to be more engaged in politics, have higher
interest in politics, and trust traditional media less (Bode and Dalrymple 2014).
By its design, social media is different than traditional media in several ways,
including the ability to interact with others, select sources of information and
avoid gatekeepers in the traditional media (Carr and Hayes 2015; Gainous and
Wagner 2014; Marichal 2012). As discussed above, the ability to self-select has
led some to argue that information echo chambers are the natural result, while
others say social media will lead to greater exposure to divergent views. The
growth of cable news networks also created a similar opportunity.
Chadwick (2013) argues that as media shifts and changes over history,
there is a period where the system is a hybrid of the new and the old. He
demonstrates how this is the case over time with changes from print to
broadcast, then to cable and the Internet. We see this with regard to the Internet,
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social media, and traditional media via examples like news organizations and
reporters using social media, as well as the ability to embed video. Social media,
then, may not yet be a distinct media platform with its own specific effects on
attitude formation and behavior. Harder, Paulussen and Van Aelst (2016) found
an example of Chadwick’s hybrid media concept in their examination of the use
of Twitter in Belgian elections. Twitter was dominated by traditional media and
political actors, an example, they argue, of Chadwick’s theory of a hybrid media
system. Marichal (2012) also points to a similar concept by saying sites like
Facebook blur the line between mass and interpersonal communication.
Social media may also present a new opportunity for individuals to be
accidentally exposed to news and information, something Downs (1957) argued
is an important way people receive information. Focusing specifically on social
media, a 2013 Pew study found that many Facebook users visit the site for
purposes other than political information, yet they are exposed to it in their news
feed (Mitchell et al. 2013). This aligns with research from Gil de Zúñiga, Jung,
and Valenzuela (2012) which found that social media, similar to television, is not
primarily used for news consumption. People visit and use these mediums for
other purposes first. Work by Feezell (2017) also supports the possible role
social media can play in delivering information to those with less interest,
specifically that it can have an agenda-setting effect on these individuals. This
suggests the possibility that social media could serve to deliver accidental
political information and have a positive effect on turnout and participation.
This type of secondhand political information, however, if received and
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interpreted from other people, may have drawbacks. Research by Carlson (2018)
suggests that people receiving second and third-hand political information may
receive less information because those who pass it along edit parts out. Further,
this information may be more distorted. “The substantive results suggest that the
amount and quality of political information declines as it propagates through more
people” (Carlson 2018, 351-2). Carlson did not look at behaviors or decisions
that result from lower quality information and she acknowledges this is an
important next step in research in this area. The nature of social media is people
and organizations sharing information. Carlson’s findings demonstrate why it is
important to better understand the relationship between receiving information via
social media and political decisions and participation. How is lower-quality
second or third-hand information received via social media related to a person’s
vote decision?

Information Processing and Social Media
The nature of social media and how individuals process information from it
may also have an effect on political participation. From the field of behavioral
economics, Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982;
Tversky and Kahneman 1975, 1981) identified several heuristics people use, and
biases that result from that use, which affect decision-making. Kahneman (2011)
later developed these ideas and others in the field into the concepts of System 1
or ‘fast’ thinking, and System 2 or ‘slow’ thinking. At the most basic level, the first
system makes quick decisions while the second requires more thought and
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analysis (Kahneman 2011). From the field of social psychology, Petty and
Cacioppo (1986) introduced the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to help
examine persuasion and attitude change. The ELM offers a similar explanation
for information processing. Finally, as discussed above, political science
research has examined the use of political heuristics to provide voters with
shortcuts when making decisions or forming opinions on candidates and issues
(Bartels 1996; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
Tversky and Kahneman: Heuristics and Biases
As early as 1973, Tversky and Kahneman began looking at the issue of
heuristics in decision making. They identified two types of heuristics:
representativeness and availability. With regard to ‘representativeness’,
individuals judge the probability that two things are similar. This includes whether
they are similar in class or result from one another. People look for “...the degree
of similarity between them” (Tversky and Kahneman 1975, 3). If they are similar,
probability is judged to be high, and if not then it is low. With ‘availability’
individuals judge the probability of an event based on how easily they can recall
similar circumstances. For each of these heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman
outline biases which render these approaches less reliable. When it comes to the
representative heuristic, they identified six biases. For example, with the ‘illusion
of validity’ people are more confident in their prediction if the outcome of that
prediction matches closely with the information or evidence they are provided.
With regard to the availability heuristic, they identified four bias. One example is
a bias due to the retrievability of instances. People judge the frequency of
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possible outcomes as being higher the more easily they can retrieve examples.
This is true even if the outcome they are comparing it to occurs just as frequently.
Tversky and Kahneman point out that these biases occur even when accuracy is
encouraged and respondents are rewarded for answers that are correct.
(Tversky and Kahneman 1975, 27). The biases are consequences of reliance on
heuristics. Their conclusion is not that heuristics are necessarily bad, but rather
they lead to predictable biases which we need to better understand.
In his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2011) brings together his
decades of research - much of it with Tversky - along with that of others to build
an argument that humans use two different systems to make decisions. He dubs
these, simply, System 1, which makes fast decisions, and System 2, which
requires deeper thought. System 1 “operates automatically and quickly, with little
effort or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” (Kahneman 2011, 20). He
further notes that System 1 has limitations including that it has systematic biases
and cannot be turned off. System 2, on the other hand, “allocates attention to the
effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations”
(Kahneman 2011 21). System 2 requires deeper thinking about a problem, is
able to compare items, and follows rules. He explains that this higher level of
thinking requires much more effort and thus is not used for every decision we
make. There are times, however, that System 1 will call on System 2 for deeper
analysis of a situation. One of the limitations of System 2, though, is “laziness, a
reluctance to invest more effort than is strictly necessary” (Kahneman 2011, 31).
So, in the end, many of the decisions made by System 2’s deeper analysis are
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still driven by System 1. Heuristics are an example of System 1 decision-making.
Kahneman explains, however, that System 2 has the opportunity to endorse or
reject the use of a heuristic. Since System 2 is generally lazy, though, it often
does not take the effort to do this analysis. Due to its nature, social media is
presented in small pieces that are easy to consume. If consumption of
information and news via social media utilizes a person’s System 1 thinking it
may lead to a reliance on heuristics and thus be prone to bias.

Elaboration Likelihood Model
In the field of social psychology, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) sought to
organize the work done in the area of persuasion and attitude change through
their Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). The ELM outlines two different routes
to persuasion, the ‘central route’ and the ‘peripheral route.’ In the central route,
individuals engage with information and give it greater thought and consideration.
For the peripheral route, far less examination is given to the information
presented. Petty and Cacioppo argue that when certain cues are present that
deem elaboration more likely, an individual utilizes the central route, when
elaboration is less likely the person uses the peripheral route. They conclude that
attitude change that takes place from the use of the central route lasts longer, is
more resistant and better predicts the individual’s behavior than that which
occurs from information processed via the peripheral route (Petty and Cacioppo
1986). Again, applying this to consumption of news and information from social
media, the peripheral route may be used more for information from this kind of
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source. While social media posts often provide the opportunity for an individual to
click through to a longer article or piece of information, the post content is first
evaluated by the peripheral route of the ELM and thus deeper consideration from
the central route is subject to this evaluation.

Heuristics and Political Decision Making
As discussed previously, political heuristics have long been considered
one method that individuals in general, and low-information voters in particular,
rely on to make political decisions. The value of these, however, is questionable.
Research has indicated that reliance on heuristics isn’t an accurate replacement
for full information and can lead to benefits for certain candidates, like
incumbents (Bartels 1986). Further, citizens may not have the proper information
or ability to utilize heuristics properly (Kulinski and Quirk 2000). In fact, reliance
on heuristics may be harmful to low-information voters who use them to make
political decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
As the youngest of the communication tools, little is known about how
individuals access news via social media and whether it ‘acts’ like traditional
media in terms of political decision-making. There are reasons to expect social
media to act the same as news consumption via newspaper, television, and
radio. Information from social media can build awareness and bring issues and
candidates to the attention of voters. It can encourage them to click a link and
read more via an online news article or to visit a candidate’s website. Some of
the political heuristics examined above could be activated by exposure to
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messages via social media, like statements by candidates or interest groups,
political party membership, and candidate demographics. Applying the research
described above, however, suggests that there are reasons to expect social
media to act differently. First, social media seems perfectly designed to engage
Kahneman’s System 1 (fast thinking) and the peripheral route in the ELM.
Scrolling through a Facebook or Twitter feed and reading posts does not entail
slow thinking. Little analysis of the post content is being done, instead individuals
likely rely on gut instincts as they read and react to them. The nature of social
media consumption suggests that people are using the peripheral route to
consume information from this source, making behavior and attitude change less
likely. Processing in this manner may not provide the in-depth engagement
needed to influence attitudes and behavior and instead it may simply rely on
existing attitudes. Consumption of news and information from traditional sources
like newspapers and television, on the other hand, may involve System 2 or
central route processing. Thus, it may be more likely to allow for attitude change
and to influence behavior. Finally, as the research into political heuristics
suggests, the use of these shortcuts does not lead to good political decision
making by individuals. Increased reliance on social media, then, may be
increasing the use of these heuristics which do not appear to work.

Social Media and Voter Turnout/Political Participation
The use of social media as a news source has grown dramatically over
the past decade (Mitchell et al. 2016; Purcell and Rainie 2014). The consumption
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of news online is increasing and Americans generally feel better informed
because of online news opportunities (Mitchell et al. 2016; Purcell and Rainie
2014). The relationship between social media news consumption and political
participation, however, is unclear. Results of initial studies during the past 10
years suggest that in some instances there is a positive relationship between
social media use and participation. Others suggest little to no relationship.
Previous research in this area has shown that individuals who consume
news online do not act much differently from those who utilize newspapers, radio
and television (Mitchelstein and Boczkowski 2010; Vargo et al. 2014). Bode
(Bode 2016) concludes, however, that while learning political information online
is possible, it does not always occur for the general public. Other studies have
found a positive link between social media and political activities like contacting a
politician, going to a rally or signing a petition (Bode et al. 2014; Broockman and
Green 2014; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng
2014; Holt et al. 2013; Pasek, more, and Romer 2009; Vitak et al. 2011; Xenos,
Vromen, and Loader 2014; Zhang, Seltzer, and Bichard 2013). These previous
studies do not include voting as a variable, however. Those that do include voting
have found some relationship between turnout and news consumption online or
via social media (Bimber et al. 2014; Bimber and Copeland 2013; Bode 2012;
Bond et al. 2012; Gainous and Wagner 2014). One interesting note about these
studies is that each one uses a different approach to measuring voter turnout: A
survey of undergraduates (Bode 2012); ANES data (Bimber and Copeland 2013)
and British Election Studies data (Bimber et al. 2014); And data from Facebook
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matched to voter file turnout data from states (Bond et al. 2012). The last study,
Gainous and Wagner (2014), doesn’t use voter turnout to measure the
relationship, rather it measures the relationship between social media and its
impact on elections from the candidate side. It looked at which candidates used
Twitter as part of their campaign strategy and had more electoral success in
2010.
Other work in this area has found less support for a link between getting
information from social media and political participation. These studies, however,
did not include voting in their analysis (Broockman and Green 2014; Dimitrova
and Bystrom 2013; Green and Gerber 2015; Kushin and Yamamoto 2010). For
example, while the 2008 presidential election has been lauded for the role social
media played in Obama’s victory, Kushin and Yamamoto (2010) suggest this was
not the case. While they did not measure turnout, their examination of political
participation found that Internet sources of information played a greater role than
social media. Other studies, on whether advertising or social pressure on
Facebook increase voter turnout, also found little effect (Green and Gerber
2015). Dimitrova and Bystrom (2013) found that social media use did not predict
intent to participate in the 2012 Iowa Caucus for Republicans. This was also the
case, however, for most traditional news, which exerted little influence on the
decision to caucus. Boulianne (2015) found that online and social media
information had an indirect effect on voting and political engagement via civic
awareness, but little direct effect.
Two studies did look at voting and came away with no relationship
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(Towner 2013) and mixed results (Bimber et al. 2013), respectively. The first
found that only television exposure increased the likelihood of voting for young
adults. The second looked at digital news consumption and voting across five
elections - 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004 and 2008. In all elections except 2008, they
found a significant relationship between voting and Internet news consumption.
In 2008, they did not. The project utilized ANES data from those elections, and
one criticism the authors made was that the survey needed to develop a better
measurement of digital news. Those ANES surveys also did not include specific
questions about social media news use because that form of communication did
not exist yet or had only recently begun. This is a general problem among many
of these early projects, which lump social media news as a source within a more
general Internet news category.
Although results are mixed, there appears to be potential for even a little
news to make an impact on involvement. Based on a sample of nearly 25,000
respondents, (Ksiazek, Malthouse, and Webster 2010) identified almost half as
‘news avoiders’ who see very little news but greatly benefit from even small
doses of news. This result seems to mirror that of Bimber et al. (2014) where
there was a larger effect of Internet news consumption on voting behavior for
those with low interest than those already interested. Further, Warren, Sulaiman
and Jaafar (2014) based on an examination of online civic engagement and
social media in Malaysia suggest that the use of social media by civic
organizations could lead to greater online civic participation. In addition, they
suggest that online civic participation may help foster greater trust in government
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and other civic institutions. Finally, Marichal (2012) argues that early research in
this area suggests that a site like Facebook might help with mobilizing voters but
it will not necessarily help us be better citizens.
There may be a couple explanations for why the results thus far are
inconsistent. First, each study approaches political participation and voting
differently. However, when looking at only the seven studies that included voting,
five of them found a positive relationship (Bimber et al. 2014; Bimber and
Copeland 2013; Bode 2012; Bond et al. 2012; Gainous and Wagner 2014). One
that did not, Bimber et al. (2014), found mixed results. That study, however,
focused mostly on online news and not social media and used election data from
years when social media either did not exist or was so young not many were
using it. Second, social media is a relatively young information platform, which
may explain some of the differences. It also points to why the question still needs
further examination. It is being adopted in greater numbers as time goes by,
initially by younger voters but over time older ones, as well.
Social media could serve as a substitute for political information from
traditional media and encourage participation by younger voters. If these voters
are able to access political information via social media, and this increases their
odds of turning out to vote, it would be positive for democratic participation. If
social media can act as a new source of information perhaps it will motivate
greater turn out by these younger voters. Turnout has traditionally been low
among younger voters (Rubenson et al. 2004). Recent research into the use of
social media and political participation by these voters suggests the opportunity
61

for increasing political participation (Bode et al. 2014; Holt et al. 2013; Xenos,
Vromen, and Loader 2014), although these studies did not look at voting. Other
research, though, found the opposite, that it does not help increase turnout
(Towner 2013). This shift to social media as a news source for younger voters
appears to be fundamental. Thus, as Gainous and Wagner (2014) argue, the
difference between younger and older voters in terms of their social media use is
not something people will out-grow. Instead, as the young demographic ages
they most likely will continue this practice, at least until some unknown future
technology comes along. Therefore, understanding the relationship between age,
social media use, and voter turnout is important to understanding the overall
effect it may have on political participation now and in the future.
A second factor that may affect the relationship between exposure to
social media and voting behavior is the individual’s political interest, which has
been found to be a strong predictor of voter turnout (Brady, Verba, and
Schlozman 1995; Chew 2016; Pinkleton and Austin 2010; Smets and van Ham
2013; Zaller 1992). Some initial work into the relationship between news
exposure from social media and political participation suggests that even low
doses of news increases political participation, like voting, for those with less
interest in politics (Bimber et al. 2014; Ksiazek, Malthouse, and Webster 2010).
Certainly, exposure to news and political information isn’t a panacea for
increasing turnout. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) point out, small changes
in the costs or benefits of voting likely won’t encourage participation. However, as
sources of news and information shift, we need to understand the effect those
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changes have on turnout and political participation.
Relative Entertainment Preference
Where citizens get news and political information is always changing.
From newspapers, to radio, television, cable and the Internet, the method of
delivery by the media has changed over time. For those interested in politics and
communication, the effect of these changes on knowledge and participation is
important. During the broadcast news era when there were only three major TV
stations to accompany print and radio, there was a greater opportunity for
individuals who were not seeking news to encounter it anyway (Downs 1957;
Prior 2005, 2007). This led to higher voter turnout because this exposure, while
accidental and likely limited, encouraged more individuals to turn out to vote. The
growth of cable television and the pre-social network Internet had the opposite
effect. It allowed those who prefer entertainment to find such content without
bumping into news.
Prior (2005, 2007) argues that greater media choice presented by new
sources, like cable television and the Internet, leads to people to segment
themselves voluntarily. Those who prefer news and have access to both
television and the Internet become more knowledgeable over time, and
knowledge is a key to turnout. Those who prefer entertainment avoid news and
turn out to vote less, leading to a turnout gap between those who prefer news
and those who select entertainment (Prior 2005, 2007). Prior believes this began
with the growth of cable television, as broadcast television offered fewer choices
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and thus greater opportunity for people to encounter news and political
information accidentally. Matthew Gentzkow (2006) is less supportive of the idea
that broadcast television provided opportunity for this kind of information. He
argues that broadcast television actually caused a decline in voter turnout from
the beginning because it offered more media options than just print and radio
(Gentzkow 2006). While Prior and Gentzkow may disagree on when the increase
in media choice caused a reduction in knowledge and turnout, in the end they
both support the idea that it did have this result.
The change in the media environment through expansion of choices is the
key to Prior’s argument. He defines the media environment as “the media
available to people at a particular place and time and by the properties of these
media. For a new medium to be available, the technology for local access must
exist” (Prior 2007, 9). In his research, Prior uses information about when certain
areas of the country received cable television and compares it to voter turnout in
those areas. It is the mere presence of cable and the choice to access it that is
important. A change in this media environment that allows more choice gives
voters the opportunity to self-select media that rarely, if ever, includes news and
political content. This, in turn, changes the mix of who goes to the polls. This is
driven by consumption choices which are voluntary. Further, Prior argues that
these changes are due to the media environment and content choices, not by
any lack of faith in the news media or elections. He found that as news
viewership declined during this period of an expansion in media choice, faith in
government and elections remained relatively steady. “The ‘inadvertent audience’
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is becoming an anachronism. And if that is true, then the very argument at the
core of the Downsian by-product learning is aging fast” (Prior 2007, 31).
This self-selection of entertainment versus news preference, he
concludes, is the best predictor of the whether they will turn out to vote. News
consumers vote and entertainment viewers do not. Gainous and Wagner (2014)
argue this to be true for social media as well. However, Prior’s study was
completed before the explosive growth of social media, an additional media
channel capable of delivering news and entertainment, social media may provide
accidental news exposure for entertainment choosers and affect the likelihood
they vote. The latest referenced work in his book is from 2006 and the book itself
was published in 2007. Some research since the Prior study has supported the
idea of social media as a source of accidental news, even from viewpoints with
which one might disagree (Bakshy et al. 2012; Bimber et al. 2014; Feezell 2017;
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012; Kim
2011; Ksiazek, Malthouse, and Webster 2010; Mitchell et al. 2013). In fact, in her
research regarding the agenda-setting potential of news via social media, Feezell
(2017) concludes that “it is likely that social media are able to subvert selective
avoidance and convey a modicum of political information to the uninterested”
(Feezell 2017, 10). Understanding media environments and their effect on
political decisions, according to Prior (2007), is going to be one of the most
important factors in understanding American politics.

Conclusion
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Understanding the relationship between social media use and the
likelihood of voting is important. Voting is a key component of democracy and
consuming political information and news from traditional media sources has
been shown to increase participation. It is easy to see why people would assume
a new source like social media may act in a similar manner. That relationship,
however, is unclear. There are, of course, differences between social media and
traditional news media. Social media, by design, encourages interaction between
users, while the traditional news media tends to be one direction, with limited
opportunities for audience members to interact with stories. Further, social media
reduces the gatekeeping function that traditional news media controlled by
allowing any user to share and promote content of any kind. In addition, there
may be differences in how an individual processes messages from social media
versus traditional news media based on length and the amount of attention a
person pays to social media content.
As outlined in this review of literature on the topic, results examining the
relationship between social media use and political participation have been
mixed. Some studies have found a positive relationship between the use of social
media and political participation, including civic activism like contacting politicians
and signing petitions. A few studies have found this relationship to exist with
turning out to vote as well, which is the specific interest of this dissertation.
Several other studies, however, have not found this relationship. There are
several possible explanations for these mixed results, including the nature of the
studies, who they surveyed, and how they measured political participation. The
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young age of social media platforms and how the use has grown over the short
time they have existed may also help explain the differences. As adoption grows,
the relationship between social media use and politics may change. Finally, the
addition of social media to the overall media environment provides many new
ways for individuals to self-select content based on preference for news or
entertainment. Prior’s (2005, 2007) examination of the relationship between
content preference and political knowledge and turnout occurred prior to this
explosive growth. The relationship between social media and political
participation, then, is still not clear.
Since increased concerns from the 2016 election over the effect of fake
news, Twitter bots, Russian financed advertising on Facebook, and even
President Trump’s unconventional use of Twitter, hinge on there being a
relationship between exposure to information from social media and election
outcomes, examining the relationship is important. The lack of a relationship
does not make these issues less important overall, but it puts them in proper
context and provides us with information for additional study of these topics.
Althought this dissertation does not address these issues from the 2016 election
directly, it does provide important context to help us undertand them. It also
informs the next steps in examination of these subjects.
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Chapter 3: The Social Media User and Traditional News User Compared

The primary goal of this dissertation is to better understand the
relationship between social media, news and political information, and the key
political behavior of voting. A first step in understanding this question is looking at
similarities and differences between those who prefer social media, those who
prefer traditional media news sources, and those who prefer both equally.
Because a key component to forming political opinion and participating in politics
is information about government and politics (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and
Zheng 2014; Luskin 1990; Popkin 1994; Prior 2007; Zaller 1992), understanding
if social media can provide this information is important. While the connection
between information from traditional media and political participation and opinion
is clear, research into a connection for social media is mixed (Bimber et al. 2014;
Broockman and Green 2014; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Dimitrova and
Bystrom 2013; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gentzkow 2006; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung,
and Valenzuela 2012; Green and Gerber 2015; Kushin and Yamamoto 2010;
Popkin 1994; Prior 2005, 2007; Smets and van Ham 2013; Towner 2013).
Further, some argue that expanding the media environment leads to a greater
ability for people to self-select out of receiving news and political information
altogether, and this leads to greater polarization (Prior 2007; Gentzkow 2006).
This chapter asks: Are there differences in demographics as well as
political attitudes and behaviors based on which media source someone prefers?
After outlining how the sample was divided into categories of preferred media,
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the chapter looks at two specific areas to examine this question. First, it looks at
whether demographics, like age, sex, and education level, are related to which
media source is preferred. Second, it examines whether there may be a
relationship between the choice of preferred media and political attitudes and
behaviors, including political knowledge, trust in government, civic engagement,
party identification and partisanship, and voting habits. Examining these groups
will help us better understand social media and traditional media consumers. It
will also lay the groundwork for the two studies that follow in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.

Data and Methods
Data for this project comes from the 2016 Time Series Study from the
American National Election Studies (ANES). This is the 30th study ANES has
conducted of Presidential elections since 1948. The sample was selected from
the population of U.S. citizens age 18 or older using probability sampling. The
survey consists of a pre-election interview conducted during the two months
before the November election, and a post-election interview in the two months
after the election. The interviews were conducted both face-to-face and via an
Internet questionnaire. For the face-to-face mode, the sample was addressbased with in-person recruitment and interviews. For the Internet mode, it was
primarily address-based sample and mail recruitment, but also included some
random-digit dialing telephone sampling and recruitment and Internet interviews.
To improve the accuracy of the significance tests as well as make the sample
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nationally representative, the Complex Sample package in SPSS was utilized.
This approach uses weights, stratum and the primary sample unit to create an
analysis plan file used during data analysis.

Grouping By Preferred Media Source
Respondents to the 2016 ANES were broken into three groups: Those
who prefer social media; those who prefer traditional news media; and those who
consume each equally. Two questions from the survey were utilized. The first
question asked respondents, “During a typical week, how many days do you use
social media such as Twitter or Facebook?” Respondents could answer from
zero up to seven days. The second question asked respondents, “During a
typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on TV, radio,
printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?” Again, respondents
could answer from zero up to seven days. It is important to point out the
difference in how these questions were asked. The social media use question
asks generally about any social media use. The traditional news media question
asks specifically about using these sources to access news. Thus, this chapter is
comparing a person’s preference for social media in general to their preference
for traditional news media.
Using these questions, a new variable was computed and named “Media
Preference Score.” This was determined by taking the number of days per week
the respondent indicated they used social media and subtracting the number of
days they used traditional news media.
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Days Per Week Social Media Use <MINUS>
Days Per Week Traditional News Media Use =
Media Preference Score
Based on the “Media Preference Score”, another variable was created,
“Preferred Media Group.” If the respondent's score was a positive number, the
respondent was coded as “Prefers Social Media.” If it was negative, they were
coded as “Prefers Traditional News Media.” If the score was zero they were
coded as “Prefers Both Equally.” Table 3.1 shows the unweighted frequencies as
well as the frequencies for each group with weighting applied to make the sample
nationally representative. One thing that is immediately clear is that traditional
news media is still the most popular. Those that prefer traditional news media to
social media outnumber the other groups by approximately 2-to-1. When one
considers that the ‘Prefers Both Equally’ category also includes traditional news
media sources, it becomes more clear. Still, those that make up the ‘Prefers
Social Media’ group amount to 26.8 percent of the total weighted sample.

One initial concern regarding the final category - preferring both equally was the potential for some respondents to have answered ‘zero’ for both the
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number of days consuming social media and ‘zero’ for the number of days
consuming traditional news media. These individuals do not consume social
media or traditional news media at all, and thus may be different from an
individual who consumes five days of each, for example. Yet both would also be
placed in the category “Prefers Both Equally.” A crosstab analysis was run to
determine how many respondents answered ‘zero’ for both social media use and
traditional news media use (See Table 3.2). Based on this analysis, only 21 out
of the 1,083 respondents, less than two percent, fall into this category. These
cases were, therefore, left in the sample for the subsequent analysis. An
additional note of interest about Table 3.2: The second largest single cell on the
table indicates that 767 respondents completely shun social media and only get
information from traditional news media, while the largest group access both
traditional news media and social media every single day of the week (930
respondents).
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Media Preference and Demographics
Age
Age is an important demographic to examine for two reasons. First,
previous research has shown that social media use, especially for news and
political information, is related to the age of the individual. Regarding the 2016
Presidential Election, for example, Pew Research Center found in January of
2016 that social media was the top source of information for those ages 18 to 29
(Gottfried et al. 2016). Thirty-five percent of respondents in that age group
indicated it was the most helpful source of information. Social media slipped to
third on the list for those age 30-49 while it was near the bottom of the list for
those over 50-years-old (Gottfried et al. 2016). More recent work from Pew
Research Center, however, shows that social media is increasing as a news
source among those over the age of 50. A study published in September of 2017
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noted a 10 percent increase - from 45 percent to 55 percent - of those 50 years
or older who get news from social media sites, while those 18-49 remained
constant at 78 percent (Shearer and Gottfried 2017).
We should expect, therefore, that respondents to the ANES 2016 study
would show a similar breakdown based on age and preferred media group, and
this is the case. To examine this variable, a new variable was created to place
respondents into age groups based on decades. As Table 3.3 indicates, among
respondents 18-29 years old, the majority (51.6 percent) fall into the ‘Prefers
Social Media’ group, with ‘Prefers Traditional News Media’ (24.9 percent) and
‘Prefers Both Equally’ (23.4 percent) a distant second and third respectively. As
one looks across the row for ‘Prefers Social Media’ in Table 3.3, the trend
expected by previous research holds true as well, with the percentage of each
age group getting smaller the older the group. In a similar manner, the
percentage in the “Prefers Traditional News Media” category for each group
increases as the groups get older.
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Education
Education is an additional area where we might expect to see some
difference in preferred media. For example, Pew Research Center found a strong
use of all types of TV news (cable, network and local) by those with a high school
education or less. Sixty-five percent watched local TV news, 59 percent cable
news, and 55 percent network news. College graduates, on the other hand, used
these TV sources less and showed a preference for Internet news sites and
apps. Only 45 percent of college graduates watched local TV news, 51 percent
cable news, and 42 percent network news. Among college graduates, though, 65
percent indicated they utilized news websites or apps (Gottfried et al. 2016).
Education level is also of interest because it has been found to be related to
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voter turnout. Generally speaking, as an individual’s education level increases so
does the likelihood they will turn out to vote (Leighly and Vedlitz 1999; Smets and
van Ham 2013).
The education level variable in the ANES data was collapsed into seven
groups from an original list of 13. This is illustrated by Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Although not as pronounced as within the age group differences, there is still a
general trend related to the respondent’s education level and their use of social
media. As education level increases, the percentage of those that prefer social
media for each age group decreases. Of particular interest is the sharp drop that
occurs once an individual completes any college degree. For those with some
college or less, but who have not completed a degree, 30.2 percent prefer social
media, with this percentage dropping to 24.9 percent for those with an
Associates Degree and 24.2 percent if one has a Bachelor Degree. Unlike age,
however, in no single education group does ‘Prefers Social Media’ have a
plurality, with traditional news media being the most preferred for all education
groups.
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Gender
Previous research has also identified differences in preferred social media
platforms based on gender. For example, women tend to use Facebook,
Instagram and Snapchat more than men. On the other hand, men tend to use
Twitter, YouTube and LinkedIn more (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). With regard
to the 2016 Presidential Election, 44 percent of people utilized social media for
political information, with men (47 percent) using it slightly more than women (41
percent) (Gottfried et al. 2016).
In our analysis, more women prefer social media to traditional news
media, as indicated by Tables 3.6. This is illustrated not just by comparing the
“Prefers Social Media” and “Prefers Traditional News Media” groups but also by
the “Prefers Both Equally” which shows that females like an equal amount of
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social media in their mix as well. Still, for both sexes, the top preference remains
traditional news media. This preference is particularly true for men, where a
majority - 55.4 percent - prefer traditional media. For women, only a plurality of
41.2 percent prefer traditional media.

Party Identification
Finally, we turn to party identification to see if there is a media preference
based on this variable. The Pew Research Center has previously identified
differences among preferred media based on political party. For example, during
the 2016 Presidential Election, they found that Republicans identified cable
television news as more helpful than Democrats, while the latter preferred local
television news (Gottfried et al. 2016). Democrats also utilized late night comedy
shows for political information more than Republicans (Gottfried et al. 2016).
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Overall, social media use for information about the 2016 election was pretty
similar across party identification. Forty-one percent of Republicans used social
media for information, 44 percent of Democrats, and 48 percent of Independents
(Gottfried et al. 2016).
Within party affiliation, our analysis finds a similar breakdown across the
thre party groups (see Table 3.7). Within each party group, traditional news
media is the most preferred but only reaches a majority for Republicans.
Independents and non-affiliated voters show some slight difference from
Democrats, Republicans and the Other category as it relates to social media. In
the Independents/NAV group, slightly more respondents prefer social media, with
nearly one-third of them falling in the “Prefers Social Media” group. This
compares with a nearly identical percentage of Democrats (21.4) and
Republicans (21.1). Slightly more respondents affiliated with the two major
parties indicate a preference for traditional media, with 53.1 percent of
Republicans and 49.2 percent of Democrats falling in this group. Independents
and non-affiliated voters (44.3 percent) lag behind.
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Media Preference and Political Attitudes and Behaviors
In this section, possible relationships between a respondent’s choice of
preferred media and political behaviors and attitudes are examined. These
include political knowledge, trust in government, and partisanship. It also
includes behaviors, like civic engagement, the respondent’s intention to vote in
the general election, and finally whether the respondent turned out to vote. For
example, as discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has found a positive
relationship between turning out to vote and both political knowledge and a
sense of civic duty. If a respondent’s choice of preferred media is related to these
factors, we might expect the choice of preferred media to also affect the decision
to vote. In addition, looking at each of these factors gives us a better overall
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understanding of any differences between individuals based on their preferred
media group.

Political Knowledge
According to past research, political knowledge is one of the most
important factors affecting voter turnout. Further, consumption of news and
information from traditional media is one way that individuals become more
knowledgeable about government (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Downs 1957;
Prior 2005, 2007; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). Understanding the
relationship between preferred media group and political knowledge, then, is an
important first step to examining the relationship between social media and
turning out to vote.
To measure political knowledge, a new variable was created by summing
the correct results from seven questions related to U.S. government and politics.
The questions included: how many years are in a U.S. Senate term; which
federal budget line item is the lowest among foreign aid, Medicare, national
defense, and Social Security; which party has the most members in the U.S.
House; which party has most members in the U.S. Senate; which office Joe
Biden holds; which office Paul Ryan holds; and who John Roberts is (See
Appendix A). Each respondent has a score from zero to seven based on these
results. As Table 3.8 indicates, those respondents who included more traditional
media in their consumption diet scored higher than those preferring social media.
The “Prefers Traditional News Media” group and the “Prefers Both Equally”
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demonstrate a similar pattern of scores on the political knowledge variable. This
is particularly clear looking first at the low end of the scale, specifically those who
only answered one question correctly. Within the “Prefers Social Media” group,
14.1 percent answered one out of seven correctly, while the percent drops
dramatically for those in the other two groups. In the same way, at the other end
of the scale, only 6.0 percent of those with more social media in their diet
answered six out of seven question correctly. The percentage increases to 12.4
percent for those with more traditional media consumption and 13.3 percent for
those who prefer both equally.
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Trust
Bode and Dalrymple (2014) found that Twitter users are less trusting of
the mainstream media. Might this distrust extend to another institution, the
government? If so, it could influence voting behavior. Hetherington (Hetherington
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1999) found that the level of trust a voter has in government can affect their vote
decision. Those more distrustful of government are more open to voting for
challengers or third parties. Additional work in a representative democracy, but
not the United States, suggests that social media may be able to help increase
online civic participation, and that engaging citizens in online civic activities can
foster greater trust in government institutions (Warren, Sulaiman, and Jaafar
2014). Respondents to the 2016 ANES were asked the following question about
their trust in government: “How often can you trust the federal government in
Washington to do what is right?” As illustrated in Tables 3.9, people were able to
answer “Always”; “Most of the time”; “About half the time”; “Some of the time”;
and “Never.” This question was used to examine the relationship between trust in
government and the respondent’s media preference. Looking at the results of the
cross-tabulation between Trust in Government and Preferred Media Group, the
first outcome that is most obvious is overall trust in government across all groups
is quite low. In addition, there is no clear difference based on which media type is
preferred. As Table 3.9 indicates, the percentage for each preferred media group
is similar for each level of trust in government. Perhaps most importantly, this is
the only variable examined that was not statistically significant as it relates to
preferred media groups.
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Civic Engagement
Brady, Verba and Scholzman (1995) argue that individuals can learn civic
skills from non-political engagement in their communities. They included this in
their ‘resource model’ of political participation, an attempt to improve turnout
models beyond simply variables like education and financial resources. Including
civic engagement in this analysis, then, gives a more rounded description of
those in the different preferred media groups in an area of interest to political
scientists. Using three questions from the 2016 ANES related to involvement in
the community, a new variable – Civic Engagement – was created. The
questions covered working with others on an issue in your community, attending
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a meeting about an issue related to your local schools or community, and
devoting time to volunteer work. Each respondent received a score from zero to
three which is the sum of their positive answer to each question. See Appendix B
for the specific questions in this scale.
Results show that those with more traditional news media in their mix of
media consumption tend to be more involved in civic activities in their
communities. (See Table 3.10) Overall, however, civic engagement based on
these three questions is low. Across the three groups, 40 percent to 47.8 percent
of respondents had zero civic engagement.
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Partisanship
Partisanship as it relates to media choice is important to examine for a
several reasons. First, Prior (2005, 2007) found that those preferring news over
entertainment tend to be more partisan. These individuals also turn out to vote
more than those preferring entertainment. He credits this for the increase in
polarization in the electorate. A second reason is that increased polarization has
had an effect beyond just loyal party members. Smidt (2017) found that
independents “are as aware of party differences and as loyal in their party
support as strong partisans were prior to polarization” (379). Polarization has
allowed independents to behave like partisans without actually joining a political
party. This has led, he argues, to a decline in the traditional idea of the “floating
voter” that may reward or punish a politician or party in the short term, eliminating
a moderating factor in American politics. The final reason relates to how
messages from social media may be analyzed by the receiver. As discussed in
Chapter 2, several researchers have identified dual process models for
information processing (Kahneman 2011; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Tversky and
Kahneman 1975, 1981). One process is quicker and relies on cues and
heuristics. The other is more slow, analytic and rational. An important heuristic in
the processing of political messages is party identification and partisanship. If
social media messages are being evaluated by the faster process, individuals
may be relying on the party heuristic. Comparing preferred media groups to party
(see above) and partisanship preferences, then, is useful. In the 2016 ANES,
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those identifying as Republican or Democrat were asked, “Would you call
yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican]?”
The results indicate that those preferring social media are less partisan
than those who prefer traditional news media and those who prefer both equally.
As Table 3.11 indicates, this difference is quite large. Less than 50 percent of
those preferring social media consider themselves strong Democrats or
Republicans. On the other hand, among those in the other categories, which
include more traditional news media, over 60 percent consider themselves strong
Republicans or Democrats. This heavier reliance on traditional news sources
versus social media and the relationship with partisanship is similar to Prior’s
original contention that those who prefer news to entertainment tend to be more
partisan. A preference for news may be an indicator of increased partisanship.
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Vote Intention and Turnout
Finally, the primary research question of this dissertation is the
relationship between social media and whether an individual turns out to vote.
Comparing preferred media groups to vote intention and to whether the
respondent reported turning out to vote gives us our first look at this question. As
Table 3.12 indicates, compared to those who prefer social media, a higher
percentage of those who prefer traditional news media, as well as those who
prefer both traditional news and social media equally, expressed an intention to
vote in the 2016 Presidential Election. At the same time, 89 percent of those
preferring social media did say they intended to vote in the election.

Similar to the results for the intention to vote, a higher percentage of
respondents in the Prefers Traditional News Media group and the Prefers Both
Equally group reported that they actually turned out to vote in the 2016
Presidential Election. As Table 3.13 shows, for these two groups more than 86
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percent indicated that they voted. Among those in the Prefers Social Media
group, only 78 percent reported having voted. All three groups, however, did see
a drop from the percentage saying they intended to vote and those that reported
they cast a ballot. According to the Pew Research Center (DeSilver 2017),
approximately 86.8 percent of registered voters turned out in 2016. However,
only about 64 percent of United States citizens who are eligible to vote actually
register in the first place. These means that turnout among eligible United States
citizens was only approximately 55.7 percent.

Limitations
There are two limitations to consider regarding the analysis completed
above. The first is the differences between the two questions used to create the
preferred media groups. The question measuring traditional news media use
specifically asks the respondent about news media consumption from these
traditional sources. It even goes as far to tell them to exclude sports. Therefore, it
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cues the respondent into thinking about their news consumption. The social
media question, on the other hand, asks a more general question about social
media use during a typical week. Respondents are not asked to think only about
news on social media. So, when considering the results above, keep in mind that
those who prefer traditional news media were answering as it relates to news
and those preferring social media were considering all of their uses of social
media. This, of course, is a general limitation of using data collected by another
individual or group versus conducting a new study designed to specifically
address the research questions and hypotheses of interest. However, the
comparison of the two groups still adds important information to our
understanding of media preference and the variables examined in this chapter.
People choose where to access information and this choice illustrates the
importance they give to each type and source of information.
Second, as outlined in Chapter 2, the approach the ANES uses to
measure political knowledge can be problematic. As Gibson and Caldeira (2009)
found, open-ended question are not as accurate as closed-ended multiple choice
questions. Open-ended questions result in less recall by individuals. These
people, however, may have a general idea of the person or institution being
asked about that is better captured by using closed-ended multiple choice
questions. They suggest, then, that open-ended political knowledge questions
should be used for “only the simplest and grossest inferences” (Gibson and
Caldeira 2009, 23).
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Conclusion
What does the examination of these factors in Chapter 3 illuminate about
traditional media, social media and the users who prefer them for information?
Table 3.25 summarizes the findings for the two main groups. First, it tracks with
the trend in other research that younger people prefer social media while a
preference for traditional news media increases as the respondents get older.
This doesn't mean that there are not older respondents who prefer social media
more, but as Table 3.4 indicates, clearly a higher percentage of those in the older
decade groups prefer traditional news media. This likely has to do with which
media sources they utilized during formative years. Review of the research on
use and age during the past decade also illustrates that an increasing number of
older Americans are adopting social media as an information source.

Next, females tend to prefer social media more than males, while a high
percentage of male respondents preferred traditional news media. In fact, a
majority of male respondents preferred traditional news media, while a higher
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percentage but not a majority of females prefer social media. With regard to
education, across all levels, traditional news media was preferred by the highest
percentage of respondents. This included 50 percent of those without a high
school diploma, the second highest percentage among a group behind only
those with a doctorate degree. There were clear trends, however, related to
social media use. In the education groups with some college or less, the
percentage preferring social media was higher. As education completion level
increased, the percentage preferring social media decreases. With a fairly
consistent percentage preferring traditional news media across all groups, it
appears that the decrease in social media preference is related to a shift to
preferring both equally.
Party identification and partisanship provide interesting results. A higher
percentage of registered Republicans and Democrats prefer traditional news
media, although it is also the preferred media group for Independents and nonaffiliated voters but at a lower level. Independent/NAVs, however, show a higher
percentage preferring social media than those in the two major parties. Add in
the results from partisanship, which is a question only asked of those identifying
as part of one of the major political parties, and the results come into focus even
more. A higher percentage of those who consider themselves 'strong'
Republicans or Democrats prefer traditional news media. Among those preferring
social media a lower percentage consider themselves a ‘strong’ member of their
party. In fact, it is nearly identical to the percentage that do not consider
themselves strong partisans. In a way, this confirms the results Prior (2005,
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2007) found in his original studies. Those who prefer news and political
information tend to be more partisan.
Looking at Political Knowledge, those respondents with more traditional
news media in their mix, in this case those preferring traditional news media as
well as those preferring both sources equally, score better on the political
knowledge measurement. The direction of this relationship is not clear. It may be
that more knowledgeable people are naturally interested in traditional news
media sources. Another explanation may be that traditional news media sources
provide better information as it relates to the questions about government and
politics that are part of the political knowledge measurement. The examination of
Civic Engagement provides a similar result. It is important to point out that
overall, based on the three questions asked about civic engagement, this kind of
engagement is low across all groups. However, those with more traditional news
media in their preference do participate more that those with a preference for
social media.
Finally, vote intention and self-reported turnout in the 2016 General
Election favor those who prefer traditional news media or prefer both equally.
While all groups said they intended to vote and then did vote at a high rate, the
percentage was lower on both measures for those preferring social media. All
three groups, in fact, saw a drop between vote intention and reported voter
turnout.
Generally speaking, it is possible that many of these habits and attitudes
are driven by age. Older generations grew up with traditional news media and
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developed the habit of using it for news and information. That habit appears to
have remained, even as new sources have come into the media environment.
Knowing that traditional news sources are positively related to political
knowledge and participation helps explain the path from traditional news
consumption through political knowledge to voter participation. Younger people,
on the other hand, have grown up in a media environment that includes social
media along with traditional news media. Their consumption habits reflect this.
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Chapter 4: Content Preference and Social Media Use

As outlined in Chapter 2, political knowledge is an important factor in voter
turnout (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Downs 1957; Manin, Przeworski, and
Stokes 1999; Prior 2005, 2007). Exposure to political information and news from
the media is generally accepted as contributing to political knowledge (Gil de
Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Luskin 1990; Popkin 1994; Prior 2005,
2007; Zaller 1992). Therefore, political information and knowledge are two of the
most important factors affecting voter turnout, with people who are more
knowledgeable about government being more likely to vote (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996; Downs 1957; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Prior 2005,
2007). Prior (2005, 2007) argues that the expansion of media choice created by
cable television and the Internet gave individuals the opportunity to avoid political
information and the news and self-select primarily entertainment content. This
self-selection leads to lower political knowledge and voter turnout for those
preferring entertainment. Gentzkow (2006) agrees that the increase in media
choices leads to a reduction in knowledge and voter turnout, although he
believes it began earlier, with the start of broadcast television. Both agree that
expansion of media choice leads to lower political knowledge and voter turnout.
Prior’s study, however, was completed before access to the Internet became
common among American households and before the explosive growth of social
media. In fact, part of his study relied on ANES data from the 1996 and 2000
elections, making it approximately 20 years old. This chapter examines whether
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his contention remains true in the age of social media and increased Internet
access. This will help better understand the overall research goal of this
dissertation, the relationship between social media, news and political
information, and voter turnout.
The advent of social media and the increase in access to the Internet
since Prior’s first studies have the potential to either reinforce the relationship he
found between media expansion and knowledge/turnout or provide greater
opportunity for accidental exposure to news and information. Internet access at
home, for example, has become nearly ubiquitous. According to data from the
2016 ANES, 89 percent of those surveyed had Internet access at home. Media
habits related to TV entertainment have also changed. The advent of on-demand
viewing via cable television, and the rapid growth of online streaming options like
Netflix, Hulu and Amazon, give people even more opportunities to choose
entertainment. Add Internet viewing options, like YouTube, Vimeo and social
media-based video, and the entertainment choices have become much more
numerous since the early part of the century. At the same time, growth in access
to the Internet and the advent of social media has also provided greater
opportunities to be accidentally exposed to news and political information.
Research conducted since Prior (2005, 2007) supports social media as a source
for such news, including information from differing viewpoints (Bakshy et al.
2012; Bimber et al. 2014; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and
Valenzuela 2012; Kim 2011; Ksiazek, Malthouse, and Webster 2010; Mitchell et
al. 2013). Studies suggest that even small increases in this kind of content can
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have a positive effect on political participation (Bimber et al 2014; Ksiazek,
Malthouse and Webster 2010).

Relative Entertainment Preference
Prior (2005, 2007) examined two hypotheses. First, access to cable
television increases the knowledge gap between those that prefer news content
and those that prefer entertainment. Second, access to the Internet and cable
television increases the turnout gap between people that prefer news and those
that prefer entertainment. It is important to note that for Prior the access to cable
or the Internet is what is important, not necessarily how much the individual used
them. For his research, Prior (2005, 2007) created a measurement he calls
‘Relative Entertainment Preference’ (REP). This measurement is a ratio of the
respondent’s news and entertainment consumption. He first tested hypotheses
related to REP through a series of questions on the News & Entertainment
Survey (N&E). Data for this panel survey of 2,358 randomly selected people in
the United States was collected by Knowledge Networks via the Internet in 2002
and 2003. This method allowed him to ask a robust set of questions about
political knowledge, events and institutions. He also collected data about
entertainment viewing by asking which of 10 television genres respondents liked
best, with each genre description including the specific name of two shows
representative of that genre. For example, respondents were asked if they liked
“Comedy/Sitcoms like Friends or The Simpsons” (Prior 2005, 580). News was
included as one of the 10 genres. This process was repeated three more times
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with the remaining genres from the set and resulted in a list of genre preferences
for the individual.
To check his results from the N&E Study, Prior replicated the study
utilizing data from the 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study (ANES)
surveys. For this study, news viewing was measured as the average the number
of days per week the respondent said they watched local or national news.
Entertainment viewing consisted of average exposure to certain entertainment
television shows. Each of the ANES studies approached this question slightly
differently. In 1996, respondents were asked about their average daily viewing of
Jeopardy or Wheel of Fortune as well as Dr. Quinn Medicine Woman (Prior 2005,
2007). For the 2000 survey, it consisted of the “average exposure to Jeopardy,
Wheel of Fortune, and ‘television talk shows such as Oprah Winfrey, Rosie
O’Donnell, or Jerry Springer’” (Prior 2005, 125). Prior expressed concerns over
the limited number of shows listed in these questions as well as the absence of
questions about specific genres, with the exception being talk shows. He
suggested that many people may have underestimated their entertainment
preference because the shows they do watch were not specifically mentioned
(Prior 2005, 2007).
Based on the answers to these questions, Prior calculated REP as a
respondent’s total entertainment viewing divided by the sum of their
entertainment viewing and news viewing:

REP = Entertainment Viewing / (Entertainment Viewing + News Viewing)
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The other variables of interest were the respondents’ access to cable television
and access to the Internet. It is important to note that these variables only
measured access and not how much the respondent used the Internet or
watched cable television. For the dependent variables, Prior measured political
knowledge by summing the correct answers on 14 questions related to
government, institutions and people. These included questions, for example,
about who controlled the U.S. House of Representatives and what job William
Rehnquist held. Turnout was self-reported for the U.S. House election (1996
ANES). Prior chose the House election turnout to reduce the likelihood of overreporting. For an unexplained reason, he did not include turnout from the 2000
ANES as a variable.
For his analysis, REP, access to cable television, access to the Internet
and the respective interactions between REP and the other two variables, were
regressed against political knowledge and whether the respondent voted. Prior
found that the interaction of REP and access to cable was in the direction
predicted and significant for political knowledge in both 1996 and 2000, and for
voter turnout in 1996. Those preferring entertainment scored lower on the
political knowledge scale and their turnout was lower. Content preference and
access to cable combined to create a gap in knowledge and voter turnout. The
results were not significant for the interaction with access to the Internet for either
political knowledge in 1996 and 2000 nor turnout in 1996. Prior concludes that
this replication supports the findings of the original N&E Survey and his
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hypotheses about content preferences, political knowledge and voter turnout.

Relative Entertainment Preference In The Social Media Age
This chapter repeats the Prior study using 2016 data from ANES to see if
REP remains the best predictor of political knowledge and voter turnout in the
age of social media. For independent variables, it maintains a similar but different
measurement for REP, entertainment and news preferences on television. The
2016 ANES survey asked a different type of question about which television
entertainment shows and news shows respondents watched regularly. This
repeat study maintains similar dependent variables, including political knowledge
and voter turnout. It replaces cable access, however, with social media use.
Further, because Internet access at home is nearly universal, this independent
variable was also dropped from the study. As noted above, 89 percent of survey
respondents (3,790 out of 4,252) indicated they have Internet access at home.
As a comparison, according to Prior (2007) only 62 percent of respondents
reporting having access to the Internet in the 2000 ANES study. Due to these
differences, it is not possible to complete a pure replication of the original Prior
study. Instead, this chapter repeats the study as closely as possible.
Based on the analysis above and support for Prior’s original hypotheses,
the following two hypotheses are proposed for this research project:

Hypothesis 1: The increase in the media environment due to social media
will increase the knowledge gap between those that prefer news and those
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that prefer entertainment.

Hypothesis 2: Likewise, there will be an increase in the voter turnout gap
between those that prefer news and those that prefer entertainment.

Data and Methods
As with Chapter 3, data for this project comes from the 2016 ANES.
Respondents are U.S. citizens age 18 or older and were selected using
probability sampling. The survey consists of a pre-election interview completed
two months before the November election, and a post-election interview during
the two months after the election. Both face-to-face and Internet collection
methods were utilized. The Complex Sample package in SPSS was used to
improve the accuracy of the significance tests and make the sample nationally
representative. To do this, an analysis plan file is created using weights, stratum
and the primary sample unit. This plan file is then used with the Complex
Samples package when running the analyses.
Measuring Relative Entertainment Preference
The 2016 ANES included a list of 48 television shows and asked whether
the respondent had viewed that show over the past month. The list included 17
news programs and 31 entertainment shows. For each category, 10 shows were
selected based on their Nielsen ratings during the 2016-17 television year. By
selecting the most popular 10 shows in each category from those presented by
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ANES, the odds are increased that the respondent may have been asked about
shows they watched. As discussed above, Prior expressed concern that the
questions he utilized to measure REP from the 1996 and 2000 ANES may have
limited the measurement. This approach, including more specific television
shows and utilizing the most popular shows, should help improve measurement
of REP. Entertainment viewing is operationalized as the average number of TV
programs from a list of 10 popular entertainment shows that the respondent
recalls watching during the past month (Table 4.1). For news viewing, it is the
average number of news programs from a list of the 10 most popular (Table 4.2).
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Based on the respondent’s score on these entertainment and news
variables, certain cases were dropped from the analysis. Since an REP score is
dependent on the individual consuming entertainment and news content, cases
were dropped for those respondents who scored zero on both the entertainment
and news viewing variables. Those who scored zero on entertainment but a
score greater than zero on news were retained, since they expressed a clear
preference for news. In a similar way, respondents who scored more than zero
on entertainment but were zero on news were also retained.
In addition to REP, the primary independent variable of interest is use of
social media. For use of social media, the ANES variable asking how many days
per week the respondent used social media (also utilized in Chapters 3 and 4)
was recoded so that those that responded zero were coded as 0 = Does not use
social media (N = 1261) and those who responded one through seven were
coded 1 = Uses social media (N = 2935). As discussed above, Prior only
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measured if the respondent had access to cable and the Internet, not if they used
it or how often. For this study, the use of social media variable was made
dichotomous and indicates at least some minimal use. This helps distinguish it
from Internet access. After all, someone with Internet access technically also has
access to social media if they chose to use those platforms.

Additional Variables Included in the Model
Several additional variables related to political knowledge and voter
turnout were included in the regression models. These include level of education,
gender, and age. Education was coded into seven categories based on how
much schooling the respondent had completed. Age was separated into six
groups by decade, with 18 and 19-year-olds included with those in their 20s, and
70+ included in one category. See Appendix C for details on variable questions.

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are the respondent’s political knowledge and
whether the respondent turned out to vote. Political knowledge is operationalized
as the number of correct answers the respondent provided to seven question
related to United States government and politics. These questions covered a
range of questions about United States political institutions and individuals; for
example if the respondent could recall what office Paul Ryan holds, which party
has the most members in each chamber of Congress, and which federal
programs the government spends the most money on. (See Appendix A)
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Voter turnout is a summary variable in ANES that indicates whether the
respondent voted in 2016 or did not vote in 2016. It is based on questions asked
both pre-election, for those who voted absentee or other pre-election day
methods, as well as post-election questions about turnout. For example,
respondents were asked which statement best described them as it relates to
voting in the election: “I did not vote (in the election this November)”; “I thought
about voting this time, but didn’t”; “I usually vote, but didn’t this time”; “I am sure I
voted.” Based on the recorded results for each of these, ANES collapsed the
responses into two variables, “Did not vote in 2016” and “Voted in 2016.” For this
study, this variable was recoded to be dichotomous with those who did not vote
coded 0 (N=444) and those who voted coded 1 (N=2887).

Analytic Plan
The Results section begins with descriptive statistics on all variables used
in the study. Both political knowledge and voter turnout were regressed on use of
social media, and the interaction between REP and the use of social media. As
indicated above, additional variables related to political knowledge were added to
the model. Linear regression models show whether political knowledge varied
depending on whether the respondent used social media, their content
preference (REP), and the interaction between REP these two variables. Further,
logistic regression models examine whether voter turnout is related to social
media use, along with REP and its interaction with social media use.
Results
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The results for Hypothesis 1 are illustrated in Table 4.9. This hypothesis
predicted that the increase in content choices provided by social media would
lead to a decrease in knowledge for those who prefer entertainment over news.
The results do not support the hypothesis. In fact, for social media use the result
was not in the direction predicted, in addition to not being statistically significant.
For REP and the interaction between REP and social media use, the results
were in the direction predicted but not statistically significant. Among the
additional variables, education and age were both statistically significant and
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positively associated with political knowledge. Gender was also statistically
significant but had a negative relationship.

Voter Turnout
The results for Hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 4.10. This hypothesis
predicted that use of social media would have a negative effect on turnout for
those who prefer entertainment over news. It was not supported. The use of
social media was in the direction predicted but was not statistically significant.
Similar to the results for political knowledge, the use of social media, REP, and
the interaction between REP and social media were not significant. Finally,
similar to the results for political knowledge, both education level and age were
statistically significant and positively associated with turnout. Unlike political
knowledge, gender was not statistically significant.
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Discussion
In this study, Relative Entertainment Preference (REP) did not predict an
individual’s political knowledge nor whether they would turn out to vote.
Further, the interaction between REP and the main variable of interest, the use of
social media, was also not related to political knowledge and voter turnout. In
other words, the increase in the number of options in the media environment did
not increase the gap in political knowledge between those who prefer news and
those preferring entertainment. In a similar manner, a person’s content
preference of entertainment versus news was not related to whether the person
turned out to vote. There was no support for either hypothesis.
This result does not support the previous findings of Markus Prior (2005,
2007). Prior found that the interaction between a person’s content preference
(REP) and access to the Internet as well as access to cable, predicted political
knowledge and voter turnout. Further, that relationship was negative so that the
interaction of REP and access to the Internet or cable had a negative relationship
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with political knowledge and with turning out to vote. Preferring entertainment led
to a gap in political knowledge and voting. Since Prior (2005, 2007) first
completed his studies on content preferences and political knowledge and
turnout, there has been an explosive growth in the media environment. The
Internet has become a big ecosystem offering more options for news and nonnews content alike. Further, social media became an integral part of most
individuals’ online activities in some manner. With so many new options in the
media environment, there are more opportunities to avoid news and choose
entertainment. This should continue to widen the gap between those who prefer
entertainment and those preferring news. This was not true in this study as it
relates to political knowledge and voter turnout.
In the regression models, the use of social media and content preference
did not have a significant effect on knowledge and turnout individually. Nor did
the interaction between the two. For social media, this can be viewed as both
good and bad. It is good because social media, at this point, is not discouraging
political knowledge and turnout. Unlike cable and the Internet in Prior’s original
study, the interaction between content preference and this variable of interest
does not create a greater gap in knowledge and turnout between those preferring
entertainment and those who prefer news. On the other hand, social media is not
acting like other traditional media sources by providing information that leads to
participation.
In a way, the results around social media are consistent with previous
research: A mixed bag. As noted in Chapter 2 and briefly in the introduction to
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this chapter, some previous research has found a positive relationship between
social media use and political knowledge and participation (Bode et al. 2014;
Broockman and Green 2014; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gil de Zúñiga,
Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Holt et al. 2013; Pasek, more, and Romer 2009;
Vitak et al. 2011; Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014; Zhang, Seltzer, and Bichard
2013). Other research has not (Broockman and Green 2014; Dimitrova and
Bystrom 2013; Green and Gerber 2015; Kushin and Yamamoto 2010). It may be
that these newer platforms for information in the media environment need time to
be adopted by individuals. Further adoption also encourages content creators to
shift content to these new platforms, or find ways to deliver their content in new
and interesting ways. Conversely, perhaps these sources, in particular social
media, merely act as secondary or tertiary sources of information and do not
provide enough on their own to increase political knowledge and spur voter
turnout.
Next, REP in Prior’s studies acted as a kind of ‘booster’ that interacted
with cable and Internet access to increase political knowledge and turnout for
news consumers, and decrease it for those preferring entertainment. This was
not the case in this study. One question raised by this result regarding REP is
whether the measurement is valid. This approach to measuring REP assumes
that content preference, via television viewing choices, is a zero-sum game.
While the amount of time a person allocates to television may be fixed each
week or month, the relative value of news/information and entertainment might
be different. Perhaps one news show, or 30 or 60 minutes per week, is all an
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individual needs to be informed enough to participate politically. If so, the fact
that they watch, say, four of the 10 entertainment shows surveyed but only one of
the news shows, may not affect political knowledge and turnout.
There has been such an explosion of new information sources and people
may simply be getting news from places other than television. Recent work by
the Pew Research Center found that people get news online in a variety of ways.
Thirty-six percent utilize a news organizations website or mobile app, 35 percent
of Americans get at least some news from social media, and 20 percent use a
search engine. Further, people are utilizing more than one site to get news, with
25 percent saying they used two or more sites, an increase of nine points over
the previous year (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). Overall, news access online has
increased and is now the second most accessed source for news, although
television is still the top choice. As of July 2016, thirty-eight percent of Americans
accessed news online via news websites, phone apps or social media. Fiftyseven percent of Americans still prefer television, radio sits at 25 percent, and
print newspaper readership has declined to only 20 percent (Mitchell et al. 2016).
This is an additional criticism of Prior’s original study. He focused on news choice
as it relates to television and did not measure news from other sources, like
newspaper and radio.
Another possibility is that entertainment choosers are being exposed to
news and information in other manners, and getting the news and political
information they need to increase political knowledge and spur turnout from other
sources. As discussed above, social media may be able to provide what Downs
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called incidental exposure to information. The design of this study is such that we
are unable to say that this is the case. Its results, however, suggest that future
studies should try to develop ways to measure if people are getting news and
information accidentally from social media and other Internet use.

Limitations
There are several limitations to take into consideration regarding this
study. This section will look at those and provide suggestions for improvement
and future examination. First, following the lead of Prior’s original study, this
repeat chose to consider use of social media as a dichotomous, yes or no,
variable. Further, because Prior chose the access approach with regard to the
Internet, this study chose to not include the Internet as a variable of interest, as
household access is already so high. It did not measure how often respondents
used social media nor their content preferences when they go on the Internet.
The study in Chapter 5 does use an approach that measures how often a
respondent uses social media, however it does not consider content preference.
A potential weakness of Prior’s original work in this area is that he only focused
on access. For the Internet, this may have been appropriate, since it was still
very early in the history and use of the Internet. Today, Internet access is nearly
universal. For cable, he also used access as the indicator and relied on the REP
measurement as a way to gauge use of television viewing. Back then, it had the
relationship he described of increasing the gap in political knowledge and
turnout. Today, it appears the growth in the media environment from social media
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has not followed suit in terms of content preference, political knowledge and
turnout. As stated above, perhaps the amount of use of each platform, as well as
which sources people prefer, needs to be part of future analysis.
How Relative Entertainment Preference is measured may also need to be
improved. Comparing the number of television shows in each genre may not be
the best measurement of preference. As discussed above, someone may only
watch one television news program, and get informantion from other places such
as newspapers or radio, but could conceivably watch more than one
entertainment show. While this indicates a preference for entertainment based on
Prior’s definition of REP, perhaps only a little news exposure is necessary for
political knowledge and to spur turnout. Prior’s measurement in the N&E Survey
was a better approach because it asked people to choose from genres and to
choose from an ‘available’ list. Individuals’ thus weighed options against one
another. For REP to be relied on, a better measurement should be developed to
account for all news options (television, radio, newspaper, Internet) and all
entertainment options (books, movies, video games etc.). The 2016 ANES
includes a stand-alone questions about news use per week on television,
newspapers, radio and Internet, as described in previous chapters. But it does
not include a similar question for general ‘entertainment media’ use. The
measurement scale for these variables also does not neatly match that for
television viewing. For other media sources, respondents were asked about
weekly use, while the television show viewing is a monthly measurement.
As discussed in Chapter 2, issues around the measurement of political
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knowledge have been raised by other academic researchers. Specifically,
Gibson and Caldeira (2009) point out that the use of open-ended questions,
asked without any context, do not adequately measure a respondent’s political
knowledge. In fact, they specifically criticize the American National Election
Study for using such questions. In their own work, Gibson and Caldeira (2009)
found the use of closed-ended multiple choice questions provide a better
measurement of political knowledge. Since the study in this chapter relies on
ANES data and their questions around political knowledge, these criticisms need
to be kept in mind.
Finally, data for this study was collected during the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. Presidential elections in general produce higher voter turnout. In fact,
this is one reason Prior (2005, 2007) utilized self-reported turnout for the House
of Representative elections when using ANES data for his studies. Since
presidential elections have higher turnout, it may be harder to isolate particular
variable effects related to turnout. Further, self-reporting carries its own concerns
related to over-reporting by individuals. Future studies should consider ways to
mitigate these issues by potentially focusing on lower turnout elections and using
official turnout reports from elections officials to see if people actually cast a
ballot.
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Chapter 5: Social Media, Traditional News Media, and the Odds of Turning
Out to Vote

In this final study, we address the central research question of this
dissertation directly: What is the effect of social media on voter turnout?
Specifically, this study examines if consumption of social media acts in a similar
manner to consuming news from traditional media sources and increases the
odds an individual will vote. News and political information from traditional
sources has been identified as increasing the odds a voter turns out to vote by
several studies over the past decades (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995;
Smets and van Ham 2013; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This study also
takes into consideration the results of the analysis in Chapter 3 to help devise the
hypotheses and identify additional variables to use in the regression models.
As outlined previously, voting is an important component of democracy,
providing a way for citizens to participate in governance by choosing
representatives, expressing opinion and to even enacting new laws directly (Dahl
2006; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999;
Przeworski 1999; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Whether an individual
decides to participate depends on many factors. Two, in particular, that have
been identified as influencing this choice are age and education. As voters get
older, turnout increases, and the more education they have completed the more
likely they are to vote (Leighly and Vedlitz 1999; Smets and van Ham 2013;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In addition, political knowledge also affects
turnout, with individuals who are more knowledgeable being more likely to vote
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(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Downs 1957; Geys 2006; Leighly and Vedlitz
1999; Luskin 1990; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Prior 2005, 2007;
Smets and van Ham 2013). Where individuals gather political information and
whether it increases the odds they will vote is the focus on this chapter.
Traditional news media sources, like newspapers, television, radio, and the
Internet, have been found to have a positive effect on voter turnout (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1997; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gentzkow 2006; Gil de Zuniga,
Jung and Valenzuela 2012; Popkin 1994; Prior 2007; Smets and Van Ham
2013). With the rapid growth over the past 10 years of social media like
Facebook and Twitter, some research has examined whether it also has a
positive effect on voting. Some of these studies have found a positive
relationship between social media and participation, including aspects beyond
voting like signing a petition or communicating with an elected official (Bimber et
al. 2014; Bimber and Copeland 2013; Bode 2012; Bode et al. 2014; Bond et al.
2012; Broockman and Green 2014; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gil de Zúñiga,
Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Holt et al. 2013; Pasek, more, and Romer 2009;
Vitak et al. 2011; Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014; Zhang, Seltzer, and Bichard
2013). Other studies have not found this positive relationship (Bimber et al. 2014;
Broockman and Green 2014; Dimitrova and Bystrom 2013; Green and Gerber
2015; Kushin and Yamamoto 2010; Towner 2013).
The relationship between social media use and voter turnout is also
important because more and more individuals are using it for news and political
information. Social media is increasing as a source of news, passing traditional
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sources like cable television, local television and print newspapers. As of August
2017, 67 percent of Americans reported using social media to get some of their
news (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). This is particularly true for those under the
age of 50 years old, but older voters are also using it more for political
information (Gottfried et al. 2016; Shearer and Gottfried 2017). This connection
between social media use and age was also examined in Chapter 3, where we
demonstrated that those in the ‘Prefers Social Media’ group tended to be
younger while those preferring traditional news media were older. Because age
is associated with both voter turnout and the use of social media, it is an
important variable to consider for the study in this chapter.
In a similar way, education is an important factor related to voter turnout,
with turnout increasing the more education a person has completed. The analysis
of preferred media groups in Chapter 3 also identified a trend between education
levels and choice of media. Specifically, the preference for social media was
higher for those who had not completed a college degree of any kind, and
declined for those with an Associates Degree and Bachelor Degree. Overall,
however, all education groups had a higher percentage of individuals preferring
traditional news media. At the same time, the analysis in Chapter 3 identified
slightly better political knowledge for those who include more traditional news
sources in their media diet. The percentage of those in the Prefers Social Media
group was higher for low scores on the political knowledge scale than the other
two groups. In the same way, it was lower for the other end of the scale. Political
knowledge appears to be positively linked to the choice of media group, which is
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consistent with previous research. Since higher political knowledge is also
related positively to voter turnout, this is important to consider.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we examined whether the increase in the media
environment after the growth in Internet access and social media use was related
to increasing the gap in political knowledge and voter turnout between those
preferring entertainment and those preferring news. Unlike previous results in
similar work by Prior (2005, 2007), the study in Chapter 4 did not find this
relationship. At the same time, it also did not find a positive relationship between
social media use and political knowledge nor voter turnout. While it is good that
the addition of social media to the mix of options is not discouraging political
knowledge and participation, it also does not appear to be related to increasing
turnout. According to this study, then, social media is not acting like traditional
media and providing political information and news that leads to participation.
The study in Chapter 4 considered social media use as a dichotomous
variable, simply whether the respondent used it or did not. This was done to
repeat the Prior (2005, 2007) study as closely as possible. In that original study,
mere access to cable and the Internet were measured. The study here in
Chapter 5 considers the number of days each week a person uses social media
and the number of days respondents use traditional news media. As discussed in
Chapters 1 and 2, there has been an increase in the use of social media in
general as well as for news and political information. The amount of use may
matter for a couple of reasons. First, while people visit social media for a variety
of purposes, many not related to news or politics, they are still exposed to this
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type of information in their news feed (Mitchell et al. 2013). This provides an
opportunity for accidental exposure to such information, and the more a person is
on social media the more likely they are to receive accidental news. Second, for
many people social media is growing as a source for news and political
information (Gottfried et al. 2016). This is particuarly true for voters younger that
50 years old (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). It is replacing traditional news media
sources, like television, newspaper and radio, as the preferred information
source for many voters. Measuring the number of days each week a respondent
uses social media as well as traditional news media, then, is a better
measurement than simply whether or not they use it.
Based on the previous research as well as the analysis completed in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the following two hypotheses are offered here in
Chapter 5:

Hypothesis 3: Increased consumption of social media will not increase the
likelihood the individual turned out to vote.

Hypothesis 4: Increased consumption from traditional news sources will
increase the likelihood the individual turned out to vote.

Data and Methods
As with the analysis completed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, data for this
study is taken from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) survey.
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The ANES surveys U.S. citizens aged 18 and older via the Internet and face-toface methods, with respondents being selected using probability sampling. Both
a pre-election and post-election survey are completed with the respondents.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable measures whether the respondent voted in the
2016 Presidential election. Respondents were asked during the post-election
survey which statement best described them as it relates to voting in the election:
“I did not vote (in the election this November)”; “I thought about voting this time,
but didn’t”; “I usually vote, but didn’t this time”; “I am sure I voted.” Based on the
recorded results for each of these, ANES collapsed the responses into two
variables, “Did not vote in 2016” and “Voted in 2016.” For this study, this variable
was recoded to be dichotomous so that 0 = “Did not vote” and 1 = “Voted”.

Independent Variables
The two variables of interest for this study are Social Media Use and
Traditional News Media Use. Both of these were measured during the preelection survey. To measure social media use, respondents were asked, “During
a typical week, how many days do you use social media such as Twitter or
Facebook?” and could answer zero through seven days. To measure traditional
news media use, they were asked, “During a typical week, how many days do
you watch, read, or listen to news on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the
Internet, not including sports?” As with the social media question, respondent
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could answer from zero up to seven days.

Additional Model Variables
In addition to consumption of social media and traditional news media, this
study also includes three control variables, education level, age, and gender. As
discussed above, education level and age have both been found to be positively
related to voter turnout. Further, analysis in Chapter 3 illustrated a potential
relationship between those variables and the choice of preferred media. This was
also true for gender in Chapter 3, where a higher percentage of women were
identified as preferring social media than men.

Analytic Plan
The Results section begins with descriptive statistics on all variables used
in the study. A logistic regression model (Table 5.7) is used to show if the odds
the individual turned out to vote vary depending on consumption of social media
and traditional news media. It includes the control variables in addition to the
variables measuring social media use and traditional news media use. This
model shows how all of the variables of interest relate to voter turnout.
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Results
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Both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are examined in Table 5.6. The first
hypothesis looked at whether social media use increased the odds an individual
turned out to vote and predicted that it would not increase those odds. As Table
5.6 shows, there was no statistically significant relationship between social media
use and voter turnout. This supports Hypothesis 3. Further, there is a statistically
significant relationship between the use of traditional news media and turning out
to vote. The odds of voting increase significantly (14.9%) ([100(1-1.149)%]) with
every additional day a person consumes news from traditional news media
(Exp(b) = 1.149, p < .001). Hypothesis 4 is supported. Consuming news from
traditional news media sources increases the odds of voting by about 15 percent.
Social media consumption, however, is not statistically significant with regard to
increasing the odds of turning out to vote. Education level and age, however, are
both statistically significant and increase the odds an individual will turn out to
vote.
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Discussion
The media environment has changed considerably over the past 15 years.
Consumption habits have shifted away from newspapers and toward Internet
sources, although television consumption remains high especially among older
citizens. Add into that mix the advent and rapid growth of social media, like
Facebook and Twitter, and citizens have more and more places to get news and
political information. In fact, a growing number of individuals report that they get
news from social media, and this includes a growing number of older voters
(Gottfried et al. 2016; Shearer and Gottfried 2017). Whether social media, then,
acts like traditional media and increases the odds
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a person votes is an important question as more and more people use it for news
and information. As discussed in Chapter 2 and briefly in the beginning of this
chapter, previous studies looking at the relationship between social media and
political participation have found mixed results. Some have identified a positive
relationship, including a positive relationship with voter turnout (Bimber and
Copeland 2013; Bode 2012; Bond et al. 2012; Gainous and Wagner 2014).
Others have found a positive relationship but only with non-voting activities, like
contacting an elected official or signing a petition (Bode et al. 2014; Broockman
and Green 2014; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and
Zheng 2014; Holt et al. 2013; Pasek, more, and Romer 2009; Vitak et al. 2011;
Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014; Zhang, Seltzer, and Bichard 2013).
As the study in Chapter 5 indicates, at this point increased consumption of
social media does not increase the odds an individual will turn out to vote. While
the results for social media in each model it was included in were in a positive
direction, they were not significant. On the other hand, despite the growth in
media options, traditional news media continues to be one of the best predictors
of voter turnout. This variable was statistically significant in every model it was
included. Therefore, these results lead one to conclude that as it relates to voter
turnout, social media is not acting in a similar manner as traditional media by
increasing the odds an individual will vote. On a positive note, while social media
does not increase the odds a voter turns out, it also does not decrease the odds.
It is not acting to discourage participation in the political process.
Finally, although not the focus of this study, the results reinforce the role
131

age and level of education play in turnout. This is interesting for age in particular
because of the increased use of social media by those in younger age groups.
One potential result was that social media could help increase turnout for
younger voters if it acted like traditional media. That is not the case. One
suggestion for future research is to focus on only younger voters to see if
increased social media use might serve the same role as traditional news media
related to voter turnout just for this subgroup. This would also help understand
the behavior of these younger generations as they age. Does social media
remain an important information source as they get older?
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, Limitations and Discussion of Future Research

The goal of this dissertation is to clarify the relationship between social
media, news and political information and examine if social media have an
impact on whether an individual turns out to vote. It examined this question in
three different ways. First, it looked at the similarities and differences between
individuals who prefer social media, those who prefer traditional news media in
newspapers, on TV and radio, and the Internet, and those preferring both
equally. Next, it examined whether the increase in options in the media
environment created by the addition of social media platforms affected political
knowledge and voter turnout. Specifically, whether a person’s preference for
entertainment or news is related to political knowledge and turnout in the social
media era. Finally, it tested the question directly by analyzing whether the use of
social media is related to an increase in the odds of whether a person turns out
to vote. Based on the results of these studies, there is additional information
about the relationship between social media and political participation that will
help inform future studies into this issue. In Chapter 6, these results are
analyzed, limitations to the studies are discussed, and suggestions for future
research in this area are proposed.

Discussion of Key Findings
Overall, the studies in this dissertation demonstrate that the use of social
media has no relationship, neither a positive nor negative, with political
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knowledge and voter turnout. The use of traditional news media, like television,
newspapers, radio and the Internet, on the other hand, continues to increase the
odds an individual will vote. Further, the addition of social media to the media
environment is not creating a gap in political knowledge or in voter turnout for
those who have a preference for entertainment versus news.
Differences in the demographics, and political attitudes and behaviors
between those who prefer social media and those who prefer tradition news
media were identified. These provide additional information on the relationship
between social media and political participation, and point to new directions
research should consider. For example, those who prefer social media are
younger, tend to be female, and demonstrated lower political knowledge and
civic engagement. Vote intention and self-reported turnout favors those preferring
traditional media or who prefer both social media and traditional media equally.
Vote intention and turnout percentage was lower for those preferring social
media.

Relative Entertainment Preference
Expansion of options in the media environment from the growth of social
media did not increase the gap in political knowledge or voter turnout based on
content preference. There was no difference in political knowledge nor in voter
turnout based on a person’s Relative Entertainment Preference or use of social
media, nor from the interaction of the two variables. As discussed in Chapter 4,
this result does not support Prior’s original findings and contention that content
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preference is the best predictor of political knowledge and voter turnout. It also
does not support his belief that an increase in media options creates a gap in
political knowledge and voter turnout based on the preference of entertainment
over news content.
Finally, no relationship was found between social media use and turning
out to vote. The use of social media does not increase the odds that a person will
turn out to vote. On the other hand, it also does not have a negative relationship
and decrease those odds. Traditional news, on the other hand, continues to be a
predictor of voter turnout, along with a person’s age and education level.

Social Media as a News Source
If social media does not act like traditional news media and increase the
likelihood of voting, is it acting instead like entertainment? Past research found
that people go on social media for purposes other than news and political
information yet they encounter it there incidentally (Mitchell et al. 2013). Based
on the results in Chapter 5, it appears that incidental information from social
media is not spurring voter turnout. It is important to note that the dissertation
study did not directly examine social media and incidental exposure to news and
political information. If social media is acting more like entertainment, it isn’t
distracting from news and political information and increasing the gap between
voter turnout and political knowledge. As Chapter 4 found, in the social media
age Relative Information Preference did not predict political knowledge nor voter
turnout. At this point, it is a good news/bad news situation for social media, at
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least in regards to voter turnout and political knowledge. The bad news is that it
isn’t increasing either turnout or knowledge. The good news is that it is also not
increasing the gap in turnout (Ch. 4 and 5) and knowledge (Ch. 4). Traditional
news media, on the other hand, continues to be positively related to voter
turnout. It will be interesting to see if once social media passes traditional news
sources as the preferred news source - if in fact it does - whether it eventually
acts like traditional news.

Implications
Living in a Hybrid Media World
One possible interpretation of the results of these studies is that we are
living in what Chadwick (2013) calls a hybrid media system. This occurs in the
period after new media sources or platforms are introduced and, for a period of
time, the new and the old take on characteristics of each other. As the studies in
this dissertation suggest, it may be difficult to single out the effects of one
particular media type when they have adopted similarities from the others. With
social media being barely more than a decade old, thinking of the results through
the lens of the hybrid media system may help understand the mixed results.
For example, Chadwick argues that while more people are getting political
news online, the original source of that content is usually traditional sources, like
newspapers, television or cable news stations, or radio. This makes it more
difficult to gauge whether online consumption is the one having the effect. This
mixing of the old and the news is only increasing, too. Consider that the online
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video giant Netflix has recently announced its plans to add a news magazinestyle show similar to CBS’s long-running 60 Minutes or ABC’s 20/20 (Teodorczuk
2018). Further, it raises the question of what individuals consider the source of
news content. If they read a story from the Washington Post or CNN on Twitter or
a friend posts the story on Facebook, do they consider that as getting news from
social media? Finally, social media content may simply be having a reinforcing
effect on news and information gleaned from traditional news sources.

Social Media, Fake News, and Propaganda
As discussed in Chapter 2, the ideas of fast and slow thinking, and the
limitations of political heuristics, raise serious questions about social media as a
reliable source of political information. It also raises questions about the possible
use of social media for propaganda purposes. First, reliance on social media for
news and political information could cause people to digest and act upon
information from unreliable sources. Kahneman explains that our System 1
thinking is driven by ideas we pick up over our lives, and we may not even be
aware of the source for these ideas. “What psychologists do believe is that all of
us live much of our life guided by the impressions of System 1 - and we often do
not know the source of these impressions” (Kahneman, 2011, 64). According to
Petty and Cacioppo, however, attitude and behavior change occurs best when
the central route is engaged. If social media is mostly engaging the peripheral
route it may only be reinforcing existing habits and attitudes. This would help
explain the results from the studies in this dissertation, which found that social
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media use was not related to voter turnout while traditional news media use
continues to have a positive relationship.
A second possibility is that social media may be having an effect through
an indirect route. First, information passed along via social media has the
potential to be distorted. Carlson (2017) suggests that a distortion of the news
occurs as people share social media posts about news and that the further down
the chain of sharing one is the less information one receives.
Feezell (2018) established that agenda setting can occur from information
presented on Facebook. In her study, individuals who were shown political
information demonstrated a higher level of salience with the issue presented than
those who did not see the information. Further, the result was particularly true for
those with low political interest. Raising the salience of a topic would encourage
individuals to pay closer attention to news stories about that topic from other
sources, including traditional news media. Further, Chadwick (2013) points out
the role of inter-media agenda setting whereby information or story ideas from
posts from bloggers are picked up by traditional news media and become stories.
He points out that while blogging is not as prominent as the early 2000s, much of
that content has now moved to social media sites like Facebook and
Twitter. Thus, through agenda-setting, political information presented on social
media may be having an indirect effect by focusing an individual’s attention on
specific issues or influencing coverage by the broader media.
An additional way social media could have an indirect relationship is if the
information consumed via those platforms mixes with news and information
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consumed from other sources, and the individual does not recall the sources.
This brings to mind an argument made by Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1992) in her
book Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction and Democracy. Jamieson argues that
voters gather pieces of information over time but forget where they come from.
These ideas mix together and voters forget if the source is a legitimate news
source or one designed to persuade. “Like pack rats, voters gather bits and
pieces of political information and store them in a single place. Lost in the
storage is a clear recall of where this or that ‘fact’ came from” (Jamieson 1992,
17). Jamieson’s specific concern is with information from political ads mixing with
news and voters forgetting which is which. With the advent of social media,
where we are reading ideas and views from individuals mixed with those from
news media sources, this problem may be compounded even further. Did I hear
that idea from someone on Facebook or from a news article? Kahneman is
worried as well about whether our System 1 can tell the difference. “But do you
discriminate sufficiently between ‘I read in The New York Times…’ and “I heard
at the watercooler…’? Can your System 1 distinguish degrees of belief?”
(Kahneman 2011, 114) He uses the old idea of a chat at the watercooler, but
social media has become our watercooler magnified.
Recent studies around the issue of ‘fake news’ have helped focus what is
known about social media and the spread of false, or intentionally false,
information. A recent review of existing literature on fake news (Lazer et al. 2018)
found that little is known about how it affects people and how far such ‘fake news’
reaches. They point out that knowing how many people were potentially exposed
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to such news doesn’t tell us how many read it or how many it had an effect on.
Little is also known about what effect it has on political behavior (Lazer et al.
2018). Some research has looked at who tends to read such news. Research by
Guess, Nyhan and Reifler (2018) found a lack of evidence for the idea that those
with less political knowledge only consumed such information. In fact, fake news
consumers tended to be heavier consumers of hard news. Further, as Alcott and
Gentzkow (2017) point out, people’s recall of fake news stories is not reliable. In
their study of fake news stories conducted shortly after the 2016 Presidential
Election, they found that respondents were equally as likely to recall and believe
a real fake news article topic from the election as they were a placebo article
topic created by the researchers. They suggest that this finding indicates that
respondents overstate their recall of real fake news articles from the election.
While the results from this dissertation do not directly address these
issues they do provide additional points to consider. Presently, it appears there is
no direct relationship between social media and the odds of someone turning out
to vote. Knowing this allows us to focus, instead, on potential ways social media
may have an indirect effect or to compound effects from other information
sources, as discussed above. Further, it is not creating a gap in political
knowledge for those who prefer social media to traditional news media sources.
News and information that is related to political knowledge continues to come
from newspapers, television, radio and the Internet. It may be that social media
simply reinforces this existing knowledge, but perhaps it may also introduce
topics or stories that lead people to traditional news sources for more
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information.
Taken together, these results suggest that there are numerous ways that
information from social media could have an indirect and potentially damaging
effect on those who rely on it for political information. Could information from
social media be working in a secondary manner? Perhaps social media is used
to activate partisans or hardcore supporters who then advocate or promote views
to others. Another possibility is that political information disseminated by social
media could be used to change the media agenda to focus on particular issues
or to distract from specific stories. The co-mingling of information received and
processed quickly from social media with news and political information from
traditional sources is occurring, and via this route social media may in fact be
having an effect on political participation. More than any other type of media,
social media allows for the mixing of news, entertainment and opinion all in one
feed. This makes the untangling of information sources important and finding a
way to examine these potential indirect effects would be valuable. In the
discussion that follows around design limitations and ideas for future research,
suggestions are offered that may help in this regard. These include utilizing a
population-based survey experiment approach, examining the amount of news
and the length of news content and its relationship to political participation, and
looking at news consumption from social media and information recall.
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Limitations and Recommendations
Research Design
The research design approach for this dissertation, along with the analysis
of the results, raises some questions related to design. As researchers continue
to examine questions related to media use and behavior generally, and political
behavior specifically, improving design and looking for new and innovative
techniques will help address these. This section of the final chapter addresses
these and provides suggestions. First is how researchers approach the
examination and measurement of specific news and information sources.
Isolating a specific channel is challenging, and may be impossible, with false
recall, agenda setting, and how individuals interpret and act on information. As
discussed above, in a hybrid media system described by Chadwick (2015) the
content may come from a traditional media source but be distributed online. The
results in this dissertation suggest that traditional news sources still play a large
role in not only the media diets of Americans but in their political knowledge and
political participation. Trying to examine a specific media platform, then, may also
remove that channel from the role it is playing relative to the others.
An additional limitation to the use of the ANES data is it relies heavily on
self-reporting. Measurements of social media use and traditional news media use
are both self-reported. Voter turnout is self-reported. This approach relies on
individuals to provide accurate information. Are people distinguishing where
they’ve received information? Are they accurately reporting it when asked on a
survey? One possible solution is to rely more on controlled studies. This could be
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done in a traditional lab situation, where individuals are exposed to specific
messages from specific platforms. This approach offers its own downsides, in
particular the fact that it does not put the person in a real world situation. Another
option is a population-based survey experiment as advocated by Mutz (2011).
This approach combines traditional large sample surveys with greater control of
the treatments they are exposed to and the variables affecting respondents.
Subjects and questions for these kinds of studies are developed in a similar
fashion as traditional surveys but subjects are randomly assigned to different
treatment groups (Mutz 2011).
Some researchers are finding innovative ways to create studies using
actual social media platforms. Feezell (2018), for example, used the groups
function in Facebook for her study on agenda setting. She created a control
group and a treatment group and randomly assigned participants to them. Study
participants received news stories posted to their group in their regular Facebook
feed, replicating a way people might be exposed to news on this platform. By
creating the groups, she was able to provide different stories to each group. It is
an interesting approach that offers better control and puts the content in an
actual social media platform. An additional step that could be taken using this
framework is create a group that gets news from online-only sources and
compare it to another that receives news from traditional news sources posted to
Facebook.
Next, when it comes to the self-reporting of voter turnout, one option is to
utilize existing sources that prove someone has voted, like voter lists from the
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election offices of the Secretary of State or from individual counties. This
approach offers additional information about the participants, which is another
advantage. Using these lists confirms that the person actually cast a ballot. It
would also allow the grouping of participants based on their vote history, which
allows the inclusion of a new variable measuring the frequency that somebody
votes over time, or specific elections they vote in. For example, vote history
shows whether an individual only votes in the General Election in a presidential
year or if they consistently vote in every election. Practically speaking, anonymity
of participants could be protected by grouping people by their vote history and
choosing a random sample from each group.
Finally, a better measurement is needed for how much news exposure is
needed to spur participation. Prior’s original approach of asking individuals to
choose from among several types of programming and repeating this question
multiple times, required people to compare what they preferred and select each
time from a list of several genres. When Prior (2005, 2007) used ANES data to
address the same question, he had to rely on the questions ANES asked. In his
case, the findings supported his original contention regarding content preference,
political knowledge and voter turnout. The study in this dissertation did not. As
discussed in Chapter 4, perhaps Relative Entertainment Preference (REP)
measurement is not the best because it assumes an equal amount of news and
entertainment has the same effect. For example, the effect of one entertainment
TV show may not be the same as one news program. The REP measurement
assumes this is the case. Maybe just a little news is all someone needs. The
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greater number of choices in the present media environment may be having an
effect on political knowledge and participation but measuring an individual’s
content preference using the approach in this dissertation should be improved.
Future studies that rely on the REP concept should either use an approach
similar to Prior’s original one or find a better way to measure content preference
using existing data. The next section discusses potential future studies, one of
which is to better understand the amount of news in a person’s media diet is
needed to spur turnout. That suggestion stems from the concerns expressed
here.

Future Studies
The results from the studies in this dissertation suggest several areas of
interest for additional research.

Age, Social Media Use and Turnout
Although overall social media use did not predict turnout, perhaps it does
for certain subgroups based on age. This could be the case because younger
groups have adopted social media as a news source more quickly and in greater
numbers than older generations. This was demonstrated by the descriptive
statistics in Chapter 3 and is also a trend evident in research conducted by the
Pew Research Center (Mitchell et al. 2017; Shearer and Gottfried 2017). The first
step would be to isolate specific age groups and examine if there is a relationship
between social media use and turnout. If there is, looking further at news and
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political information consumption habits, including how often, how much and from
what sources, would help better understand the current relationship for younger
voters. It would also help understand how social media may eventually have a
similar relationship for older voters as they adopt more of it in the media diet and
it replaces traditional news media sources.

Amount of News Needed to Spur Political Participation
As discussed above, the use of Relative Entertainment Preference as a
measurement of content preference between news and entertainment raises the
basic question of how much exposure to news and political information is needed
to affect political participation. This is a baseline need for this area of research.
Before the rise of cable television, when there were only a few broadcast
channels, radio, newspapers and magazines, researchers didn’t seem to
question that 30 minutes of local news and 30 minutes of national news via
television, along with newspaper and radio, was enough exposure to create a
positive relationship with voter turnout. With the incredible change in the media
environment over the past 20 years, from the growth of the Internet and social
media to the decline in newspaper subscriptions, better understanding how much
exposure to political information is needed in this new environment is an
important step. A main question related to this is how to measure this
consumption in a meaningful way.
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Content Length and Political Participation
By their nature, social media posts contain less and may be processed
more quickly by individual’s, utilizing the peripheral route described by Petty and
Cacioppo (1986) or System 1 as described by Kahneman (2011). If this is the
case, these posts may not be enough to motivate a person to vote or even to
change an attitude. As Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argue, attitude change is more
likely from information processing by the central route, which requires deeper
thinking. Thus, are short posts or headlines enough to have an effect on political
knowledge and/or behavior? Additional research in this area could compare
political habits and knowledge of individuals exposed to only short social media
posts to those that read more deeply on a subject. This area also probes the
issue of incidental exposure discussed above. Can incidental exposure via social
media act as a way to spur voter turnout? Are short tweets or Facebook posts
providing enough information to increase political knowledge and influence the
decision to go to the polls, or are they simply reinforcing existing attitudes and
beliefs? Examining these questions would help us better understand how the
existing literature on incidental exposure applies to social media or whether this
new form of communication acts differently.

Social Media and Information Recall
Finally, research on the subject of information and source recall needs to
continue to be done. As both Jamieson (1992) and Kahneman (2011) warn,
content may be absorbed but we forget the original source. This could lead
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people to mix information from legitimate news sources with information from
social media posts by friends, family or untrustworthy sources, and not remember
which is which. Recent studies in this area demonstrate why this is a concern.
For example, while older and younger news consumers click links at a similar
rate, the younger news consumers are less likely to remember the source of the
story (Mitchell et al. 2017). Further, recent work on ‘fake news’ by Allcott and
Gentzkow (2017) found a significant amount of false recall of news stories and
headlines from the 2016 presidential election. While, at this point, social media
does not have a direct relationship with voter turnout, it may be having an indirect
one and information recall could be one of the ways.

Conclusion
The 2016 U.S. presidential election brought significant attention to social
media and its role in the political process. It did so through several sensational
aspects, including Russian-paid Facebook advertising, the use of digital bots to
spread information, and the prolific and sensational use of Twitter by Donald
Trump. While the sensational stories grab the headlines, there is still a need to
better understand the basic relationship between social media, news and political
information, and political habits and attitudes. The media environment has
changed dramatically in the 21st Century. This, in turn, has changed media
habits. The use of traditional news media like newspapers, television and radio
has declined and shifted to online sources like news websites and social media.
This changes where we get political information, and because of the importance
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of information to voting behavior it may have an effect on this important part of
democracy.
The analysis of the existing literature and the new studies presented in
this dissertation provide important insights into how to proceed with additional
examination of the relationship between social media use, traditional news media
use, and political participation. It examined the fundamental relationship between
social media, news and political information to better understand how these
changes may affect democracy and voter turnout. The results show that unlike
traditional news media use, the use of social media does not increase the odds
an individual will turn out to vote. Even with a significant increase in the number
of options available in the media environment driven by social media and the
Internet, a person’s traditional news media use is still related to the odds they
turn out to vote. Further, at this point the use of social media and an individual’s
content preference of entertainment versus news is not related to political
knowledge nor voter turnout. While social media does not appear to have a
positive effect on turnout, the good news is that it does not appear to discourage
a person from voting either. The dissertation does, however, outline several ways
that those who prefer social media differ from those who prefer traditional news
media. These include demographics like age and gender, as well as political
habits and attitudes like partisanship and political knowledge. More work,
however, needs to be done. This dissertation has helped clarify the situation and
laid the groundwork for additional examination of social media, our changing
media environment and its relationship with democracy.
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To this end, the dissertation offers specific suggestions on how to improve
future studies from a methodological standpoint, and offers ideas for next steps
to better understand the research question. In terms of design and methods,
future studies should utilize methods that reduce issues related to self-reporting
of variables like social media use, traditional news media use, and turning out to
vote. This can be accomplished, in part, by creating research scenarios that use
the actual social media platforms we are interested in examining. Future studies
should also attempt to implement treatment groups via population-based survey
methods in order to better measure potential relationships between media use
and variables of interest. Lastly, the results of this dissertation suggest areas for
future research. This includes examining social media and information recall. Do
people remember where they received news, and how is that related to political
participation? In addition, future studies need to look at the indirect ways that
social media may be related to political habits and attitudes. For example,
agenda-setting might explain how social media influences what traditional news
media outlets cover. Additional research in these areas will help better
understand the relationship between an individual’s social media use, their use of
traditional news media sources, and whether they turn out to vote in an everexpanding media environment.
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